eternalist mean different things by“ 9 ,”but it is possible to translate claims made by
the presentist into claims acceptable to the eternalist, and vice versa.
In order for presentists and eternalists to substantially disagree about what there is,
they need to mean the same thing by“there is.”But if meaning is determined byuse
and the use of a term consists of dispositions to assert certain sentences employing
the term, then it initially looks like the presentist and the eternalist must mean
different things by“there is.”But the alleged“translatability”of claims made by the
presentist into claims made by the eternalist (and vice versa) shows that there is some
phrase employed by the presentist that has the same use as“there is”when employed
by the eternalist. This helps cement the idea that the presentist and the eternalist are
“speaking past each other,”that their“dispute”is not substantive.^8
One could argue that the presentist’s“there will be, there is now, or there was an F”
does not have the same use as the eternalist’s“there (tenselessly) is an F,”since the
two expressions have different properties.^9 But, as noted in section 1.4, an independ-
ent (and more general) rejoinder is that meaning is not determined by use alone.
A second factor isnaturalness: natural meanings are more eligible to be meant, other
things being equal. Recall that, according to Sider (2001, 2009, 2011), there is a
metaphysically fundamental meaning for“ 9 ”that both the presentist and the
eternalist employ when they argue about what exists, and this is why their debate
is genuine.^10
With this in mind, let’s re-characterize presentism, eternalism, and the growing
block theory so that each explicitly appeals to metaphysical fundamentality:
Presentism* = the view that there is a metaphysically fundamental sense of“ 9 ”
such that“~ 9 x(xis a past or future object)”is true.
Growing block theory*= the view that there is a metaphysically fundamental sense
of“ 9 ”such that each of the following is true:“ 9 x(xis a past object),”“ 9 x(xis a
present object),”and“~ 9 x(xis a future object).”
Eternalism*= the view that there is a metaphysically fundamental sense of“ 9 ”
such that each of the following is true:“ 9 x(xis a past object),”“ 9 x(xis a present
object),”and“ 9 x(xis a future object).”(^8) Strictly, meanings are determined by the use of all the members of the linguistic community rather
than merely by the individual uses of individual speakers. Let’s set this aside though, since it might not
make the philosopher of time happy to learn that the way to assess which view here is correct is via analysis
of her community 9 ’s use of ontological expressions.
This line is pursued in Sider (2006). Sider (2001: 15–16) points out that there are sentences that are
true according to the eternalist, but false according to the presentist. For example, consider:“There is a set
that contains a dinosaur and a computer.”The eternalist believes this sentence is true, but the presentist
doesn’t think there was such a set, is such a set, or will be such a set, and so will deny it. In a similar vein,
Cocchiarella (1969: 37) suggests that past existence cannot simply be understood in terms of present
existence and tense operators. 10
Or, at least, there is a metaphysically fundamental meaning that bothcouldemploy in order to ensure
a substantive debate.