The Meinongian presentist could minimize these differences by holding that the
only non-existent objects are past objects. Call this viewminimal Meinongian
presentism(MMP). MMP and PEP are not merely notational variants. As discussed
in section 1.5.2, I understand Meinongianism as the view that there are (at least) two
fundamental quantifier locutions, which we can neutrally call the (or an)inner
quantifierand theouter quantifier.^18 According to contemporary Meinongians, the
outer quantifier—henceforth“ (^9) o”—corresponds to the unrestricted“some”of ordin-
ary English, whereas the inner quantifier—henceforth“ (^9) i”—corresponds to“there
exists.”Table for a moment this linguistic thesis, and focus on this key feature of
Meinongianism: everything within the domain of the inner quantifier is within the
domain of the outer quantifier, but the converse does not hold. In short, the two
fundamental quantifiers are nested.^19 (This is why a Meinongian says that there are
some things that do not exist, but doesn’t say that there are some existents that
nonetheless aren’t.)
By contrast, the fundamental quantifiers recognized by PEP have disjoint domains.
So, according to PEP, there is no fundamental sense of“some”whereby“some
entities are both past and present”is a truth. Note that, although both PEP and
MMP are inconsistent with presentism*, MMP unlike PEP entailsboththe growing
block theoryandpresentism*. These facts ensure that PEP and MMP are not mere
notational variants.
However, I grant that both views might receive support from some of the same
considerations. They might also face some of the same objections. For example,
Simon Keller (2004) claims that it is very hard to see how one knows that one
is present given Meinongian presentism. A similar worry can be raised about
PEP. I take this worry very seriously, and will discuss it in section 3.8.
3.4 PEP and Degrees Presentism
PEP is in some respects like the view defended by Quentin Smith (2002), Degrees
Presentism. According to Degrees Presentism,
Being temporally present is the highest degree of existence. Being past and being futureby a
merely infinitesimal amountis the second highest degree of existence. Being pastby one hour
and being futureby one hourare lower degrees of existence, and being pastby 5 billion
yearsand being futureby 5 billion yearsare still lower degrees of existence. The degree to which
an item exists is proportional to its temporal distance from the present; the present, which has
is unclear what he has against the tooth fairy. That said, Joshua Spencer has pointed out to me that one
might think thatfictional objects cannot actually exist. McGinn (2000: 38–9) holds this view.
(^18) See Perszyk (1993: 7–9, 16) and van Inwagen (2006: 122–5) for discussion of Meinongianism that
also appeals to an inner and outer quanti 19 fier.
We could also consider a third view in which there are three nested fundamental quantifiers: one for
everything that there is, one for everything spatiotemporal, and one for everything present.