Bounded Decision Rationality and the Logic of Appropriateness 189
attaching the problem to the solution, questions of problem defi nition and possi-
ble better solutions fall away.
Temporal sorting describes the fl ows of solutions, problems, and decision-
makers. In their simulation of garbage can decision processes, March and Olsen
(1976) describe choices made by oversight, problem resolution, and fl ight. Under
conditions of oversight, in temporal sorting a choice opportunity arrives but no
problems attach themselves to the choice. No problems are resolved. Consider
the military, AmeriCorps, or community service as solutions and the opinion of
some that the events of September 11, 2001, call for mandatory national service.
Th us far, no problems have attached themselves to these proposed solutions. Un-
der conditions of problem resolution, problems are associated with choices, and
decisionmakers have the attention and energy to link them and thereby solve the
problem. Consider the use of the Army Reserves and the National Guard to over-
see airport security. Consider universities presenting themselves as choices for
research and development, economic development, or moral leadership. Some
universities tend to imagine they are the solutions to a wide range of problems.
March (1994, 205–206) groups those interested in garbage can theory as fol-
lows: (1) the critics who see garbage can processes as the enemy of proper deci-
sionmaking; (2) the pragmatists who use garbage can processes to their own ends
by attempting to have their solutions attached to every problem that comes along;
and (3) the enthusiasts who see garbage can theory and temporal sorting as the
future of decision theory.
Applications of the chaos metaphor to decision theory are rather similar to
the logic of garbage can processes. What appear to be disorder, chaos, and highly
unsystematic patterns of institutional decisionmaking can, in fact, hide deep pat-
terns of order. Th ese patterns of order have to do primarily with temporal sorting,
the rhythms of time in work processes, group norms in work settings, budget
cycles, reporting cycles, and so forth. Th e patterns reveal not only an underlying
organizational symmetry but also primarily incremental patterns of contextual
adaptation. For reasons rather similar to the explanations of garbage can pro-
cesses, organizational decision symmetry will change nonincrementally as the
result of relatively minor changes in key decision processes. Chaos theorists love
the butterfl y metaphor: Butterfl ies fl apping their wings in Tokyo may cause a tor-
nado in Oklahoma, an example of nonlinear, nonincremental, and mostly unre-
vealed orderly substructures in what appears to be chaos (Kiel 1994). As shown
by Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner (2005b), disproportionate updating
of beliefs can also produce nonincremental policy change that, while appearing
unpredictable, is the logical outcome of limits in attention capabilities.
Despite the claims of chaos theory, decision processes are seldom as chaotic
as claimed, and order is a good bit easier to fi nd than claimed. Th at everything
connects to everything else and that a seemingly small decision choice in one
part of the organization can result, later in time, in a big consequence elsewhere,
are interesting ideas. Th e problem is that most versions of chaos theory applied