Conclusions 191
self-interest as the guiding norm; or (2) the street-level-worker model, which
acknowledges discretion and assumes that it is exercised to make work easier,
safer, and more rewarding. Maynard-Moody and Musheno did not fi nd ei-
ther of these models, but found instead the citizen-agent model (they call it a
counternarrative).
Rather than discretionary state agents who act in response to rules, proce-
dures, and law, street-level workers describe themselves as citizen agents who act
in response to individuals and circumstances. Th ey do not describe what they do
as contributing to policymaking or even as carrying out policy. Moreover, street-
level workers do not describe their decisions and actions as based on their views
of the correctness of the rules, the wisdom of the policy, or accountability to a
hierarchical authority or democratic principle. Instead, they base their decisions
on their judgment of the individual citizen client’s worth.
Street-level workers discount the importance of self-interest and will oft en
make their work harder, more unpleasant, more dangerous, and less offi cially
successful in an eff ort to respond to the needs of individuals. Th ey describe them-
selves as decisionmakers, but they base their decisions on normative choices, not
in response to rules, procedures, or policies. Th ese normative choices are defi ned
in terms of relationships to citizens, clients, coworkers, and the system. But in
substituting their pragmatic judgments for the unrealistic views of those holding
formal and legitimate authority, street-level workers are, in their own view, acting
responsibly. Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s fi ndings are splendid examples of
the decision rationality of appropriateness and the processes of sense making.
But such discretion can also lead to negative consequences. Take, for exam-
ple, the 2014 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence “Committee Study of the
Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program.” Th e “en-
hanced” interrogation techniques used by CIA offi cers to reportedly gain use-
ful information in the war on terror were not authorized by the government
and were based on faulty evidence regarding their eff ectiveness; in addition, the
agency misrepresented its actions to the White House, the Offi ce of Inspector
General within the CIA, and the media. Th e street-level workers, the CIA offi cers
deploying the interrogation techniques, according to the report, used their own
judgment in ways that were neither authorized nor conducive to preventing fu-
ture terrorist attacks.
Conclusions
We can make several generalizations from this review of decision theory in pub-
lic administration. First, there is an obvious close affi nity between the decision
logic of consequences and rational or public choice theory, the subject of Chap-
ter 8. Th e former tends to a greater emphasis on the bounds of rationality, the
later to a greater emphasis on pure rationality. Both are grounded in economics
and political science and tend to use the same methodologies. Second, there is