Trust and the Irrational Bureaucrat 205
maximize their own self-interest, but managers can improve effi ciency. Tullock
and Downs both presented a picture of a self-interested bureaucrat quite will-
ing to distort information, and subsequently the public, in order to maximize
individual self-interest, that is, career advancement. Th e solution that emerges
from this framework is primarily institutional—-more rules, more rigid struc-
ture, more hierarchy. More recently, however, evidence exists suggesting that the
solution depends less on the structure of the institution and more on the interre-
lationships between actors within the institution.
A growing body of literature suggests that bureaucrats’ responses to the task
environment oft en depend on psychological, nonmonetary assessments. For a
leader, whether in an organization or in elected offi ce, to be eff ective, he or she
must possess a certain set of skills that encourage follower trust, thereby increas-
ing follower productivity and a willingness to comply with authoritative requests.
Scholars have classifi ed these skills under the umbrella of “political skill,” and they
are characterized most prominently by an ability to form lasting social networks
and the possession of a certain set of social skills that allow for interpersonal in-
fl uence (Ammeter et al. 2002; Ferris et al. 2005; Hall et al. 2004). Leaders with
high levels of political skill tend to be viewed as more eff ective leaders and are
positively correlated with work unit performance (Douglas and Ammeter 2004).
Leader political skill also tends to positively aff ect perceptions of organizational
support among subordinates, in turn increasing job satisfaction and organiza-
tional commitment (Treadway et al. 2004). Th ere is good reason to expect such
fi ndings to apply to both the private and the public sector.
Th e public management literature has a rich theoretical tradition focusing on
the relationship between leaders and followers. Beginning with Chester Barnard’s
(1938) “acceptance theory,” perceptions of bureaucratic authority have been
critical to the study of public management theory. Barnard argued that the ef-
fectiveness of administrative authority depends on the willingness of others to ac-
cept and comply with such authority. Following Barnard, public administration
scholars have long recognized the infl uence of individual personalities on orga-
nizational activity and performance (Simon 1947/1997; Downs 1957; McGregor
1960; more recently, Terry 1998; deLeon and Denhardt 2000). Recent empirical
evidence shows that perceptions of a leader’s characteristics infl uence whether a
follower will engage in a particular behavior (Dirks and Skarlicki 2004; Kramer
1999; Kramer and Cook 2004; Kramer and Tyler 1996). Followers that attribute
competence and trustworthiness to leaders are not only more likely to follow au-
thoritative requests but are also more likely to engage in risky behavior on be-
half of leaders/managers (Elsbach 2004) and are less likely to perceive a need to
break the rules or “sabotage” the organization (Brehm and Gates 2004). More-
over, employees are more likely to identify with their organization and engage in
voluntary compliance with organizational norms when they trust their superiors
(Darley 2004; Dirks and Ferrin 2001; Podsakoff , MacKenzie, and Bommer 1996).
Th is is a direct counter to one of Downs’s behavioral biases that bureaucrats will