Rational Choice as the New Orthodoxy 213
understand bureaucratic behavior and the production of public services but also
as a normative, democratic theory of administration in its own right.
Th e most forceful and best-known articulation of this argument comes from
Vincent Ostrom in his book Th e Intellectual Crisis in American Public Adminis-
tration (1973). Ostrom’s central thesis was that public administration scholarship
was centered on a theoretical construct that was in the process of breaking down.
Ostrom (24–25) argued that the intellectual foundations of public administration
were built upon a set of seven theoretical propositions formulated by Woodrow
Wilson. First, there is, and always will be, a dominant center of power in any
system of government. Second, the more power is divided, the more irresponsible
and diffi cult to control it becomes. Th ird, the structure of a constitution deter-
mines the composition of central power. Fourth, the process of government can
be separated into two parts: determining the will of the state (politics) and exe-
cuting the will of the state (administration). Fift h, although the institutions and
processes of politics vary widely from government to government, all govern-
ments share strong structural similarities in administration. Sixth, “good” admin-
istration is achieved by the proper hierarchical ordering of a professional public
service. Seventh, perfection of “good” administration is a necessary condition for
advancement of human welfare.
Th ese basic propositions, Ostrom (1973) argued, were used to construct the
paradigm that constituted orthodox public administration theory; that is, admin-
istration could be considered separately from politics, and good administration
was tied to the organizational form of Weberian bureaucracy. Ostrom noted,
however, that this orthodox thinking ignored some of the lessons conveyed by
Weber’s conception of bureaucracy, even as it embraced others. Weber consid-
ered bureaucracy a technically superior form of organization in the sense that it
favored merit, professional expertise, rational division of labor, and standardized
decisionmaking processes. Th ese seemed a worthy alternative to patronage, parti-
san fealty, and political expediency as a basis for carrying out the will of the state.
Yet, as Ostrom (25–28) pointed out, Weber’s theory also suggested that mature
bureaucracies would become central political institutions, not just technically su-
perior agents of implementation. Th e fully developed bureaucracy would enjoy
a huge informational advantage over their political masters, and there was no
reason to expect that advantage would be deployed to advance the public interest
over the bureaucracy’s interest.
Ostrom argued that public administration scholars had concentrated on the
technical superiority of the bureaucratic organization—its purported abilities to
produce public goods effi ciently—while ignoring the potential implications for
the democratic process. Weber, Ostrom noted, also described a democratic alter-
native to the hierarchical and authoritarian basis for administration inherent in
bureaucracy. Weber said that a democratic administration would have four char-
acteristics. (1) Everyone is assumed to be qualifi ed to participate in the conduct of
public aff airs. All citizens, not just technocrats, are assumed to have the necessary