Are Bureaucracies Out of Control? 33
is the requirement by Congress that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
move forward, on a strict timetable, to develop rules for the requirement of tran-
sponders to aid in avoiding aircraft collisions aft er a midair crash in 1986. In-
deed, West and Raso (2012) fi nd that Congress has a prominent role in directing
agencies to make rules, and they argue that this form of co-management requires
further research. At a minimum they argue that this is so prevalent that accounts
of legislative inability to direct the bureaucracy be tempered.
Congress may be a combative opponent by using a kind of zero-sum logic.
In this model, Congress acts to reduce or eliminate discretion it once granted
to the agency. Gilmour and Halley (1994) argue this will occur primarily when
budget conditions create strong incentives to “take credit’ for costs savings, al-
though other situations may also lead to an adversarial relationship, particularly
when bureaucracy makes mistakes. Th e recent case of the failure of the Forest
Service–controlled burning program and the problem of untrimmed and over-
grown forests near towns is illustrative. Congress is simply bringing back grants
of discretionary authority once held by the Forest Service in order to both punish
the agency and improve forest management.
Finally, Congress can be a passive observer. Oft en, Congress becomes pas-
sive aft er some sort of congressional intervention in a program. Once Congress
establishes mechanisms to oversee policy implementation, it can adopt a passive-
observer style of co-management. One example is nuclear waste policy aft er the
establishment of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. Congress can be
less vigilant as it can rely on these sorts of institutional mechanisms.
Th e evidence for these forms of congressional co-management is compelling.
Taken altogether, they seem to indicate that there are many forms of political
control over bureaucracy at the federal level and that such control is extensive.
It does not appear that bureaucracy is out of control. If anything, the range of
bureaucratic discretion appears narrow. Gilmour and Halley do a splendid job
of detailing the characteristics of congressional co-management, but they have
less to off er those interested in the eff ects of co-management on the bureaucracy.
Gilmour and Halley do make this point:
Congressional co-management has both improved and blurred the clarity
of executive accountability for results. Increased accountability was docu-
mented in the form of new independent entities to check on the performance
of the executive and more frequent or more extensive reporting requirements.
Complicated lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability were more
frequently observed, especially in domestic policy where an emerging congres-
sional “para bureaucracy” signifi cantly aff ects interbranch relations and execu-
tive capacity.
As a matter of general complaint among some executive branch offi cials and
other observers, Congress’s members and their staff s have insinuated themselves
inappropriately and unaccountably into administrative management. Although