36 2: Th eories of Political Control of Bureaucracy
have both the opportunity and incentive to manipulate politicians and pro-
cesses for political gain” (1994, 23). As might be expected, this advantage is
increased when politicians do not have time to develop their own expertise.
Nicholson-Crotty and Miller (2011), for example, fi nd that bureaucratic infl u-
ence in the legislative process increases when term limits force turnover in the
legislature.
One important mechanism to control bureaucracy, which can perhaps be
called the modern form of accountability, is the use of reporting to hold bureau-
cracies accountable for their performance. Th is creates a “distinctly subordinate
and responsive role” for the agents (Dubnick 2005, 386). Th us, performance and
accountability to political principles become tightly linked, and reporting thus
enhances the power of the principal over the agent. Th e move toward the use of
organizational report cards, particularly by the federal government since 2001,
is symptomatic of this form of accountability. Organizational report cards are
useful for establishing and maintaining control, as they provide data about many
agents simultaneously and in standardized formats to principals who are inter-
ested in assessing performance (Gormley and Weimer 1999). Th ey also serve to
reduce the information advantage typically enjoyed by bureaucracy over elected
offi cials. Th e use of reporting as a control mechanism became well known when
George W. Bush’s administration instituted the Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART), which the Offi ce of Management and Budget used to hold other govern-
ment agencies accountable for success. As an example of how the tool was used,
poor PART scores in the Commerce Department resulted in the consolidation of
the Community Development Block Grant program and the Economic Develop-
ment Assistance program.
As reporting and program evaluation have increased in sophistication, ten-
sion has arisen between principals and agents. William Gormley and Steven Balla
(2008) point out that because performance evaluation is intimately connected
to accountability, agents subject to rigorous reporting expectations may lose the
freedom to use their expertise to be innovative in the way they address the issues
for which they are responsible. In other words, as the principal increases its abil-
ity to monitor the agent, it also increases its ability to alter the agent’s behavior to
be closer to its preferences. Th is can make it diffi cult for street-level bureaucrats
to provide eff ective service. Th e popular example of this situation is the concern
over how the No Child Left Behind Act would create incentives for teachers to
simply “teach to the test” so that their classes and schools would look good on
standardized federal performance reports.
Although reporting is an important method of controlling bureaucracy, the
observation by Wood and Waterman (1994) that agencies still hold advantages in
the areas of information and expertise still holds. Coupled with the fact that or-
ganizational report cards and program evaluation can never provide a full picture
of bureaucratic performance, the principal-agent relationship is still nuanced and
complex (Gormley and Balla 2008; Palumbo 1987).