Administrative Th eory as Political Th eory 45
operating in capitalistic markets, but it is not nearly so important to democratic
government. Equity, consensus, or the satisfaction of particular interests is fre-
quently the criterion for action in democratic processes, and none of these crite-
ria is necessarily effi cient; indeed, these criteria are oft en inescapably ineffi cient.
Yet, as administration scholars accepted effi ciency as their central principle,
they also accepted democracy—a notoriously ineffi cient basis of organization—as
the central principle of the American political system. Th is presented a problem
in developing administrative theory. Th e formative era of administrative schol-
arship, with its focus on the scientifi c method, its guiding principle of effi ciency,
and its position in the shadow of business, meant that it developed in a decidedly
undemocratic context. Not only was democracy not synonymous with effi ciency
and various other business and scientifi c practices incorporated into public ad-
ministration orthodoxy, but also it was quite possibly hostile to them (Waldo
1952, 85). How could the principle central to the American political system be
squared with the forces driving the theoretical development of public administra-
tion as a discipline?
Waldo argued that the founders of public administration solved the conun-
drum by accepting democracy as the guiding principle of the American po-
litical system, but keeping it external to their professional interests through the
politics-administration dichotomy. By separating the work of government into
two distinct operations and limiting their attention to the “nonpolitical” element,
administration scholars were free to push for centralized power in the executive
branch, to prescribe hierarchical and authoritarian bureaucracies as the basis for
organizing public agencies, and to call for passing greater responsibilities to the
technocrat. As long as these reforms increased effi ciency in administration, and
administration was kept separate from politics, theoretically the discipline did
not have to square the contradictions these arguments presented to the egalitar-
ian ideals of democracy.
As Waldo was careful to point out, the founders of public administration
were not ideologically opposed to democracy. Th ey were progressive reform-
ers who embraced the romantic ideal of democracy as the “best” or “proper”
form of government. Th e reality they faced at the time, however, was a public
administration characterized by disorganization, amateurism, and dishonesty.
Nineteenth-century reforms springing from the presidency of Andrew Jackson
had dispersed and factionalized the power of government. Elected offi cials multi-
plied, the legislature took precedence over the executive, and government agencies
were staff ed through the spoils system. If administration were the core of govern-
ment, the net result of these reforms created a serious problem for democracy
in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century: a public administration
shot through with incompetence, ripe for corruption. For public administration
to gain competency and effi ciency, it would have to cleanse itself of politics and
learn the lessons of science and business. Good administration (and thus good
government) could best be promoted by centralizing and concentrating power;