Cell Language Theory, The: Connecting Mind And Matter

(Elliott) #1
400 The Cell Language Theory: Connecting Mind and Matter

b2861 The Cell Language Theory: Connecting Mind and Matter “6x9”

It is clear that there is a considerable degree of family resemblance
between the second and the third columns in Table 10.2. One interesting
feature is that Peircean semiotics is enfolded within complementarism
(as evident in row 8).
If the content of Table 10.2 is correct, complementarism and Peirce’s
semiotics may be viewed as belonging to the same lineage of philosophi-
cal systems: Complementarism and semiotics may be homologous. In fact,
complementarism may be considered as a descendant of, and encom-
passes, Peirce’s semiotics, just as quantum mechanics can be regarded as
a descendant of, and encompasses, Newtonian mechanics.
Within the validity of the content of Table 10.2, we may derive the
following conclusions:


  1. Some of the many uncertainties and confusions arising in the herme-
    neutics of Peirce’s semiotic writings may be clarified by using the
    relatively clear-cut set of the principles embodied in complementa-
    rism (e.g., see the complementarian logic in Section 2.4.2), just as
    some phylogenetic classification problems of organisms can now be
    resolved based on molecular biological data.

  2. The divisions between biology and physics on the one hand and
    between natural sciences and human sciences (including linguistics,
    philosophy, and religion) on the other may be viewed as artifacts of
    the human tendency/necessity to compartmentalize and specialize for
    the convenience of learning and teaching. These divisions may be
    eventually removed for a deeper understanding of nature and Homo
    sapiens in it.

  3. Many perplexing problems faced by the contemporary natural
    sciences (e.g., in molecular biology, the problems of protein folding,
    and mechanisms of force generation in molecular motors, gene
    expression, cancer, chemiosmosis, etc.) may not be resolved without
    the general guidance provided by sound metaphysical presuppositions
    underlying scientific research. Natural scientific problems may be too
    difficult to be solved within natural science (entailing assistance from
    philosophy), just as some philosophical problems may be too difficult
    to be solved within philosophy (entailing assistance from natural
    sciences and engineering).


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