300 Self and the Phenomenon of Life
b2726 Self and the Phenomenon of Life: A Biologist Examines Life from Molecules to Humanity “9x6”How do you know the fish are happy?” Zhuang said, “You are not me.
How do you know I do not know the fish are happy?”^1
The above conversation, purportedly taking place two thousand
and three hundred years ago, is to my knowledge the first recorded
open discussion of the private nature of mind and how difficult it is to
penetrate into other person’s mind. What I will do in this chapter is no
more than an extension of this protracted and endless contemplation on
the most enigmatic part of our life. I will attempt to bring new insights
into this age-old issue, taking advantage of the knowledge we have accu-
mulated and the clearer perspective available of man’s position in the
universe. Perhaps I can dispel some of the enigmas, but perhaps I might
make it even more mysterious.
The inner self is unfathomable and elusive, at least to a second or
third person, yet it is also intimately real, tangible, and immediate to the
person who calls himself “I.” The key to the inner self is introspection.
As William James once said, the state of consciousness by introspection “is
the most fundamental of all the postulates of psychology.”^2 Introspection
is a process of reflecting on one’s own mind. Introspective knowledge is
private, but it is no less valid than other observable knowledge. In fact,
introspection is a kind of observation, albeit directed inward and is limited
to a single observer. It is not verifiable by other people and is not subject
to statistical analysis. This shortcoming, hopefully, can be mitigated by
the scrupulousness of the observed information, especially if made by a
person who is keen and perceptive. It is the only window open if we are
to look into our own mind. We have no other choice. As Descartes tried
to say with his famous line, “cogito, ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am.),
if we do not trust the existence of our mind, which gives us all we know,
including the most tangible of matter, there is nothing else to be trusted.3,4
Charles Sherrington, after spending a lifetime as an illustrious exper-
imental neurophysiologist, turned to the mind-world problem: “Between
these two, perceiving mind and the perceived world, is there then noth-
ing in common? Together they make up the sum total for us; they are all
we have. We called them disparate and incommensurable. Are they then