Governance of Biodiversity Conservation in China And Taiwan

‘The Yangtze alligator – endemic to China – is a terrestrial species under the Wild

Animal Conservation Act and managed by SFA, but there’s conflict between MOA

and SFA concerning administrative rights over alligators and crocodiles that are

non-endemic to China but listed in the appendix of CITES. The issue should be

resolved through a revision to the Wild Animal Conservation Law. This process

began several years ago but is stalled because of struggles between MOA and SFA

on certain species and provisions.

(Why isn’t the conflict resolved, perhaps by the State Council?) The State Council

is absorbed with political problems and issues of economic development. It doesn’t

have the time to resolve a matter such as which agency should be in charge of what

species. Moreover, the State Council doesn’t involve itself as a judge without a

mutual understanding reached by the relevant ministries. Neither the SFA

Administrator nor the MOA Minister has insisted on this yet.’^30

A more general problem concerning these two ministries is that fish in rivers
of a nature reserve under SFA jurisdiction are governed by the Fishery Bureau
of the Ministry of Agriculture. No laws or regulations provide for effective
coordination of such potential (and in many cases, actual) conflicts. The PATF
report calls for greater data sharing and collaboration among agencies. Its most
compelling recommendation in this area is the formation of ‘an above-
ministry-level and cross-sectoral alliance to ensure the integration of protected
areas and overall land use and development planning, coordination among line
ministries, and supervision of protected area effectiveness’.^31 It remains to be
seen whether the State Council would endorse the creation of yet another inter-
ministerial committee.
The problem of vertical integration is much more intractable, and mirrors
the difficulty China has faced in coordinating economic development
activities from the center to provinces and local governments. The problem
here extends beyond the system of divided loyalties, with provincial and
municipal environmental bureaus responding to both national and sub-national
masters. It also reflects the difficulty of having different systems of incentives
and values. One NGO representative who had visited 60 PAs explained the
conflict between national conservation objectives and local practices as
follows:

‘There are many different local situations, and especially in the remote areas (where

most of the large nature reserves are). The biggest factor is the drive for rapid

economic development. Local governments want to develop the economy. And they

want to measure the efficiency of their officials by economic development and not

their conservation efforts. So they look at economic development needs first. Each

local government administration has only 4–5 years to get promotions, and they

focus on economic development. It is short-term, non-sustainable economic

development, and that’s the main stress to the environment in local areas. Local

governments and companies want to build big dams. They earn money from the

construction of dams. Such projects bring money to the local people, yet they are

often harmful to the environment.’^32

110 Governance of biodiversity conservation in China and Taiwan