ightglobal.com 11-17 June 2019 | Flight International | 29
PARIS
Airbus after A380250-seat twinjet family that ultimately be-
came the 787. Having had its A340 pro-
gramme undermined by the twin-engined
777, Airbus was forced to acknowledge that
its only other flirtation with a four-engined
design was equally cursed.
Enders summed up the situation well as he
confirmed plans to end production in 2021:
“There has been speculation for years wheth-
er we were 10 years too early with the A380. I
think it becomes clear that we were probably
at least 10 years too late, or more.”
Airbus was late to counter the 787, and a
tepid response to its initial proposal – a two-
variant A350 family, largely resembling a re-
engined A330 – spurred it to come up with an
all-new alternative, in the form of the A350
XWB. The irony, of course, is that Airbus sub-
sequently adopted a re-engined A330 as part
of its long-haul strategy, intended to comple-
ment not just the A350 on the upper side, but
also the longer-range A321neo on the lower.
LONG-HAUL CONFIDENCE
Airbus will want to ensure that its efforts at
the Paris air show serve not to highlight the
absence of the A380, but to convey confi-
dence in its remaining long-haul portfolio.
This will be particularly true in view of the
fact that the airframer’s first quarter was
marred not only by the termination of – and
loss of orders for – the A380, but also the coin-
cidental hefty cancellation of A350s ordered
by Middle Eastern carrier Etihad Airways.
Emirates, which had practically sustained
the A380 programme on its own, offset some
of Airbus’s start-of-year gloom with a promise
to take A330neos and A350s instead, while
Lufthansa and Taiwanese start-up Starlux
Airlines confirmed A350 agreements.
Although Airbus will find these commit-
ments for more than 100 long-haul aircraft
encouraging, they provide only partial relief
from a sector that has been under pressure.
FlightGlobal analysis reveals that Airbus’s long-
haul business suffered more than 250 cancella-
tions in the five full years from 2014 to 2018, a
figure equivalent to a third of its gross order
total. Its long-haul backlog fell by 220 aircraft
- or around 17% – over the period, even as
the airframer was benefiting from the 2014
launch of the A330neo. That move enabled it
to offer eight variants of three long-haul types,
including the A330 freighter and two versions
of the A330neo.
The A350, despite its false start, had logged
an impressive order backlog of 812 aircraft by
the end of 2013. But this figure increased by
only 82 in the subsequent five years. Analysis
of Airbus’s official backlog data shows that
148 A350s were cancelled over the period,
spread relatively evenly across the original
three family members. Fifty-six arose from the
shelved A350-800 programme, but the -900
and -1000 lost 47 and 45 respectively.
Total A330 orders increased by more than
420 during the five years. While the launch of
the A330neo programme contributed 238 of
these aircraft, the conventional A330 variants
accounted for the other 183. Airbus recorded
77 cancellations across the A330 family, in-
cluding 14 A330neos. The A380 programme
accounted for 28 cancellations.BOEING’S BACKLOG
Preliminary analysis indicates that Boeing’s
widebody backlog also declined by 17% dur-
ing the same five-year period – some 235 air-
craft. But the US airframer does not appear to
have suffered the same level of order cancella-
tions as its rival. FlightGlobal calculations put
the widebody cancellation total at 166 aircraft- equal to 14% of gross widebody orders – of
which 132 were from the 787 programme.
The 777, for which Boeing is developing the
successor 777X family, recorded 19 cancella-
tions and another 15 affected the 747.
Boeing’s 767 stood up particularly well,
with zero net cancellations, although the 134
orders for the type did not come from the pas-
senger sector but from a mix of cargo custom-
ers and the US Air Force for its tanker fleet.
Leasing company Avolon warned earlier
this year that the widebody market “remains
under pressure”, and predicted that airfram-
ers are likely to trim production rates.
Airbus had already opted to cut A380 out-
put to eight aircraft this year even before the
closure of the programme, and bring A330
manufacturing down to 50 aircraft as it transi-
tioned to the A330neo. The production rate
for the A350 has, however, steadily increased
and Airbus reached its target of 10 aircraft per
month in the fourth quarter of last year.
While both Airbus and Boeing have en-
dured a substantial whittling-down of their
widebody backlogs, their single-aisle opera-
tions, bolstered by re-engining programmes,
have bloomed. Airbus’s A320 family backlog
expanded by more than 40% during 2014-
2018, increasing by more than 1,750 aircraft.
The airframer logged 570 cancellations. Over
the same period the backlog for the 737 in-
creased by 28%, with 658 cancellations.
Boeing will arrive at the show having re-
gained, by way of a technical knock-out, the
upper hand in the high-capacity end of the
twin-aisle market, with its first 777X assem-
bled – complete with characteristic folding
wing-tips – and a crucial further endorsement
of the type secured in the form of its order
from British Airways.
Airbus is unlikely to resist any opportunity
to show off on its home territory – but it has
yet to reveal the extent to which long-haul or-
ders will contribute to its performance at Le
Bourget, and whether it is prepared to regroup
its forces to mount a new challenge against its
competitor in the gap vacated by the A380.
But with Boeing’s New Mid-market Air-
plane (NMA) still awaiting the go-ahead, and
Airbus trying to close out the NMA with the
pairing of its A330neo and A321neo – an ef-
fort that appears increasingly likely to feature
a longer-range version of the single-aisle jet –
the most interesting strategic arena might be
neither the long- nor the short-haul market,
but the grey area between them. ■New York-based JetBlue will fly the A321 on transatlantic services to London from 2021Tad Denson/MyShotzDOTcom/Airbus“There has been speculation
for years whether we were 10
years too early with the A380.
I think it becomes clear that we
were probably at least 10 years
too late, or more”
Tom Enders
Former chief executive, Airbus