Flight International – 11 June 2019

74 | Flight International | 11-17 June 2019 flightglobal.com

PARIS

Special report

W

hen the first UK BAC-Aerospa-
tiale Concorde lifted off on its
maiden flight from Filton 50
years ago, the supersonic air-
craft was far from securing its legacy as a be-
loved and admired technological achievement.
Aircraft 002, registration G-BSST, took off on
9 April 1969, flying 38 days after Concorde be-
came airborne for the first time with the depar-
ture of the French-built 001 from Toulouse.
But despite the successes, the UK govern-
ment’s opinions of the aircraft were rapidly di-
minishing. Two-and-a-half years after the Filton
flight, in November 1971, the opening line of a
confidential central policy review staff memo-
randum was explicit: “Concorde is a commer-
cial disaster. It should never have been started.”

Even in the first few months after the Filton

flight, concerns over Concorde’s appeal were

becoming apparent. The UK’s Concorde eco-

nomic prospects committee had stated that the

aircraft’s operating costs would be 90% above

those of the Boeing 747 – which had made its

maiden flight two months before the Filton

example – and there was no guarantee that flag-

carrier BOAC would take the supersonic jet.

“It is evident that if we go ahead with Con-

corde and it meets reasonable performance

specifications we must do all we can to en-

sure that BOAC operates the aircraft,” said a

memorandum by then-president of the board

of trade Roy Mason. But operation of the air-

craft, he said, could only be profitable if a

“sizeable” surcharge – up to 50% – was im-

posed on economy fares and a high average

load factor, at least 68%, was maintained.

BOAC believed that Concorde could be oper-

ated without loss on transatlantic routes, if a

suitable fare regime could be negotiated with

IATA, but this would mean “creaming off traffic

from subsonic services”, warned Mason. This

meant BOAC would still effectively be losing

£1-2 million annually on each Concorde.

AIRLINE DECISION

The airline was “likely to be able to demonstrate

that there is no commercial justification” for

purchasing Concorde, the memorandum said,

adding that BOAC was sceptical over projected

load factors – sourced from an external consult-

ant – on routes other than London-New York,

given the probable resistance from economy

passengers to high surcharges. New legislation

was being developed to establish the Civil Avi-

ation Authority and an Airways Board to over-

DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW LONDON

Employees looked on as aircraft number 002 was rolled out from its hangar at BAC-Aerospatiale’s Filton facility in September 1968

ANL/REX/Shutterstock

Economic calamity

Though hailed as the ‘finest aircraft ever’, Concorde was plagued by eye-watering

manufacturing and operating costs that scotched all hope of profitable operations