TheEconomistApril30th 2022 BriefingRussia’sarmedforces 17
EstimatedRussiansoldierskilledinbattle
Russia-UkrainewarFeb-Apr ,(UKgov ’testimate)
Second Chechenwar-,(Estimateto)
First Chechenwar-
Soviet-Afghanwar-,
,
Russiantanksknowntohavebeendestroyed,
abandonedorcapturedSource:Oryx
564
Militaryspending,$bn, adjusted for purchasing-power parity
Sources: “TheRealMilitary Balance: International Comparisons of Defence Spending”, by Peter E. Robertson, ; SIPRI; The Economist
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Russia
Britain
France
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China
United
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Russia’s spending on defence
Russia’s defence spending is often
estimated to be $66bn, lower than
Britain’s or India’s. A more accurate
figure, taking account of the cost of living
in Russia, is $253bn. Embezzlement,
however, is thought to be widespread.
Ukraine’s heroic resistance, buoyed by a
torrent of Western weaponry and intelli
gence. “But just as much credit for the shat
tering of Russian illusions lies in a phe
nomenon long known to military sociolo
gists,” writes Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins
University, “that armies, by and large, re
flect the qualities of the societies from
which they emerge.” Russia’s state, says Mr
Cohen, “rests on corruption, lies, lawless
ness and coercion”. Each one has been laid
bare by Russia’s army in this war.
“They put a lot of money into modern
isation,” says General Pavel. “But a lot of
this money was lost in the process.” Cor
ruption surely helps explain why Russian
vehicles were equipped with cheap Chi
nese tyres, and thus found themselves
stuck in the Ukrainian mud. It may also ex
plain why so many Russian units found
themselves without encrypted radios and
were forced to rely on insecure civilian
substitutes or even Ukrainian mobile
phone networks. That, in turn, may well
have contributed to the war’s toll on Rus
sian generals (Ukraine claims to have
killed ten of them), since their communi
cations at the front line would have been
easier to intercept.
Yet corruption cannot be the whole sto
ry. Ukraine is also corrupt, and not much
less so than Russia: they sit respectively in
122nd and 136th position on the Corruption
Perceptions Index published by Transpa
rency International, a pressure group.
What really distinguishes the two is fight
ing spirit. Ukrainian soldiers are battling
for the survival of their country. Many Rus
sian ones did not even know they were go
ing to war until they were ordered over the
border. A European intelligence official
says that conscripts—whom Mr Putin has
repeatedly and publicly promised not to
send to war—have resisted pressure to sign
contracts that would turn them into pro
fessional soldiers; others have refused to
serve outright. The official says that units
affected include the 106th Guards Airborne
Division and its 51st Guards Parachute Reg
iment, which are part of the notionally
elite vdv airborne forces, and the 423rd
Motorised Rifle Regiment, part of an im
portant tank division.
Difficulties in droves
Illtrained and poorly motivated soldiers
are a liability in any conflict; they are espe
cially unsuited to the complexities of mod
ern combinedarms warfare, which re
quires tanks, infantry, artillery and air
power to work in synchrony. To attempt
such daunting coordination in Ukraine
with sullen teenagers, pressganged into
service, fed expired rations and equipped
with badly maintained vehicles was the
height of optimism.
Such a task requires, at the very least,
sound leadership. And that too is in short
supply. Noncommissioned officers—se
nior enlisted men who train and supervise
soldiers—are the backbone of nato’s
armed forces. Russia does not have a com
parable cadre. There are “too many colo
nels and not enough corporals”, says a
European defence official. Staff training is
rigid and outdated, he says, obsessed with
the second world war and with little atten
tion paid to newer conflicts. That may ex
plain why doctrine was thrown out of the
window. Manoeuvres that seemed easy at
Vostokand other stagemanaged exercises
proved harder to reproduce under fire and
far from home.
To the extent that Russian officers have
studied their military history, they appear
to have imbibed the worst lessons of the
Afghan, Chechen and Syrian wars. During
their occupation of northern Ukraine, Rus
sian soldiers not only drank heavily and
looted homes and shops, but murdered
large numbers of civilians. Some have been
rewarded for it. On April 18th the 64th Mo
torised Infantry Brigade, accused of massa
cring civilians in Bucha, was decorated by
Mr Putin for its “mass heroism and cour
age” and accorded the honour of becoming
a “Guards” unit.
War crimes are not always irrational.
They can serve a political purpose, such as
terrorising the population into submis
sion. Nor are they incompatible with mili
tary prowess: Nazi Germany’s Wehrmacht
was good at both fighting and murdering.
But brutality can also be counterproduc
tive, inspiring the enemy to fight tena
ciously rather than surrender and risk be
ing killed anyway.
The savagery and confusion of Russia’s
forces in Ukraine is consistent with their
recent conduct in Syria. Their bombing of
Ukrainian hospitals echoes their bom