The Economist - UK (2022-04-30)

20 Britain TheEconomistApril30th 2022

the  question  showed  that  27%  supported

immediate  unity  in  2002,  and  30%  sup­

ported it in 2020. Enthusiasm for reunifi­

cation south of the border is hard to detect. 

Nonetheless, a Sinn Féin victory would

have practical as well as symbolic implica­

tions. Under the terms of the Good Friday

Agreement, either of the two main parties

can veto an administration being formed.

The  dup has  refused  to  say  whether  it

would  participate  in  government  if  Sinn

Féin wins. Jim Wells, a former dupminis­

ter, has said publicly that the party should

refuse  to  share  power  with  Sinn  Féin  if  it

were to get the post of first minister. Such a

decision  would  not  just  be  undemocratic

but idiotic: it would almost certainly boost

republican support.

Even if the duppulls off an improbable

victory, however, the province may not get

a  government.  That  is  because  Northern

Ireland now has two disputed borders, not

one.  A  crucial  part  of  Mr  Johnson’s  Brexit

divorce deal was the Northern Ireland Pro­

tocol,  an  agreement  that  the  province

would  stay  in  the  eu’s  single  market  for

goods and in its customs union. The proto­

col avoided checks at the Irish land border

but  created  a  new  Irish  Sea  border,  which

makes  trade  with  Britain  more  difficult

and has left many unionists believing that

ties to “the mainland” are being severed. 

In February the dupbrought down the

devolved government in protest at the pro­

tocol. It says it will not return to the execu­

tive  until  the  sea  border  is  removed.  The

British  government,  which  dislikes  the

protocol for many reasons, has been mak­

ing  noises  about  unilateral  legislation  to

dismantle  bits  of  it.  That  would  not  only

precipitate  a  bitter  clash  with  the  eubut

could  see  Sinn  Féin,  which  strongly  sup­

ports  the  protocol,  itself  refuse  to  enter

government in protest. 

The province has been in this position

before: for three of the past five years, it has

had no government. But according to Ann

Watt of Pivotal, a think­tank, a period with­

out an executive “will inevitably make life

harder for individuals and families here in

Northern  Ireland—with  the  most  vulner­

able people disproportionately affected”.

Moreover,  the  underlying  strains  in

Northern  Irish  politics  are  intensifying.

The  least  confrontational  path  to  getting

rid  of  the  Irish  Sea  border  seems  likely  to

disappear  as  a  result  of  the  elections.  The

Brexit  deal  explicitly  provides  for  a  Stor­

mont vote in 2024 on whether to keep the

Irish  Sea  border;  that  vote  will  be  decided

by  assembly  members  who  are  elected  on

May 5th. Whether the dupclings on as the

largest party or not, it is very unlikely that

unionists will win a majority in Stormont. 

If  unionists  think  they  have  lost  their

chance  to  vote  down  the  protocol,  a  more

militant approach may prevail. A year ago

serious  rioting  erupted  in  several  parts  of

NorthernIreland;paramilitariesinbala­

clavas openlytaughtchildren bornlong

aftertheGoodFridayAgreementhowto

makepetrolbombs.Theviolencesubsided

asunionistleaderssaidpoliticscouldre­

movetheseaborder,butitsthreatlingers.

Onereasonwhyunionismisunlikelyto

wina majorityintheupcomingelectionis

thegrowthinvoterswhoshunthelabelsof

“nationalist”or“unionist”.NorthernIre­

landisnolongera politydividedbyone

sectarianline,butrathera societyofthree

minorities—unionists, nationalists and

thenon­aligned(seechart).Thatsitsvery

awkwardly with political structures de­

signedwithonlytwotribesinmind:the

ballotsofcentristassemblymembersinef­

fectdonotcountinkeyvotes,forexample.

Atsomepoint,theGoodFridayAgreement

willhavetobeamended,a processwhich

willbedeeplycontentious.

WhenacceptinghisNobelprizeinliter­

aturethreeyearsbeforetheagreementwas

signed,the NorthernIrish poetSeamus

Heaneylamented “thedolorouscircum­

stances ofmy nativeplace”.The sorrow

thenwroughtbydailymurderhasbeenre­

placedbythesorrowofpoliticalfailure,

andthatisprogress.Buttheforthcoming

electionsarelikelytounderlinethebrittle­

nessoftheprovince’spolitics.Andbrittle

thingstendtobreak.n

B

rexitwasalwaysgoingtobea

bother.Thequestionwashowmuch

ofoneit wouldbe.Althoughindustries

likefinancialserviceshavenotsuffered

thedisastersomepredicted,it isnothard

tofindaggravatedbusiness­owners

complainingthatleavingtheeuhas

broughtbafflingbureaucracy,higher

costsandfrustratingdelays.A flurryof

newstudiesquantifiesthepain.

OnepaperbytheCentreforEconomic

PerformanceattheLondonSchoolof

EconomicsfindsthatBritain’sdeparture

fromthesinglemarketattheendof 2020

ledtoonlya temporarydipinitsexports

totheeurelativetoitssaleselsewhere.

Butwhentheylookat“tradeties”,orthe

rangeofproductstradedwithdifferent

memberstates,theyfinda plungeof30%

(seeleft­handchart).Thedropisconcen­

tratedinlightertradeflowstodinkier

countries.Thatlookssuspiciouslylike

smallerexportersgivingup.

Anotherstudy,publishedbytheukin

a ChangingEurope,a think­tank,ex­

plorestheeffectsofnewbarriersonthe

tradethatdidcontinue.Facedwithhigh­

ercostswhencrossingBritain’sborders

withtheeu, businessesraisedtheir

prices.Theauthorscompareproducts

likefreshporkortomatoes,whichare

mostlyimportedfromtheeu,withpro­

ductslikepineapples,whichcomefrom

moreexoticclimes.Theyfindthatby

September 2021 Brexithadliftedfood

pricesby6%relativetotheyearsbefore

December2019.(Amootedgovernment

proposaltocutfoodtariffsmighthelp,

thoughremovingnon­tariffbarriers

mattersmoreforimportsfromtheeu.)

ComparingBritain’seconomicperfor­

mancewiththatofsimilarcountries

suggestsa broaderproblem.Catherine

MannoftheBankofEnglandhaspointed

outthatbytheendof 2021 consumer

priceswerearound4%higherthanin

otherwisecomparableeconomiesthat

didnotexperienceBrexit(seeright­hand

chart).Asthecostoflivingsoars,a differ­

enceofthismagnitudereallymatters.

Brexit

Left behind

LeavingtheEuropeanUnionhascrimpedtradeandraisedprices

Something happened

Britain

Sources:CentreforEconomicPerformance;

BankofEngland

*Oneexportvarietyreferstoa productsenttooneparticular country

†Acompositeofselectedcountries similar to Britain

110

100

90

80

70

60

21201918171615142013

Exportvarieties*,Q22016=

Non-EUmarkets

EUmarkets

Brexit

referendum

Tradeand

Co-operation

Agreement

115

110

105

100

95

90

2120191817161514132012

Consumer prices, 201 average=

Comparable

countries†

Britain

Brexit

referendum

Trade and

Co-operation

Agreement