The Economist - UK (2022-04-30)

54 International TheEconomistApril30th 2022

tancy  will  probably  fall  “massively”,  says

Mr  Sobotka.  He  points  out  that  the  brief

war  between  Azerbaijan  and  Armenia  in

2020 was largely responsible for a decline

in life expectancy among males of three to

four years. 

Russia,  too,  is  certain  to  suffer.  Thou­

sands of well­educated Russians have left a

country  which  they  now  believe  offers

them  no  future.  Fewer  migrants  may

choose  to  come  to  Russia  from  former

members  of  the  Soviet  Union  to  take  up

jobs requiring few skills. For the first time

in  decades,  Russia’s  migration  balance

may  turn  negative.  To  Mr  Putin’s  dismay

births  will  probably  fall.  Like  his  friend

Viktor  Orban,  Hungary’s  authoritarian

leader,  Mr  Putin  has  been  splashing  out

cash  to  encourage  women  to  have  babies.

In 2020 he extended a one­time “maternity

capital” payment worth $7,600 to families

when  they  have  their  first  baby;  before,  it

was  available  only  to  those  who  already

had  a  child.  Mr  Putin  hoped  to  boost  the

fertility  rate  from  1.5  to  1.7.  The  tumult

caused by his war will probably push it in

the opposite direction.

The Pole position

Countries to the west of Ukraine look like

demographic  gainers,  although  the  influx

is putting a strain on some, especially tiny

Moldova,  which  has  received  more  than

400,000 refugees—equivalent to 15% of its

population.  For  Poland,  where  some  1.4m

Ukrainians  lived  and  worked  in  2020,  the

arrival  of  millions  more  turns  the  demo­

graphic  clock  back  to  before  the  second

world  war,  when  the  country  had  a  large

Ukrainian minority. Inter­ethnic animosi­

ty, which culminated in a post­war forced

population exchange between Poland and

the Soviet Union, has diminished. 

In  theory,  the  newcomers  should  give

Poland a boost. The ruling Law and Justice

Party  has  been  keen  to  increase  the  num­

ber  of  Poles.  In  2016  it  sought  to  raise  the

birth  rate  by  giving  families  500  zlotys

($115) a month for every child after the first.

The effect was mainly to encourage women

already  planning  to  have  children  to  have

them earlier lest the benefit be withdrawn.

The number of births rose in the scheme’s

first two years, but dropped in 2020 to the

lowest  level  since  2003.  The  Ukraine  war

has added more than a million children to

Poland’s population, at least temporarily. 

Other  European  countries,  especially

those  with  large  Ukrainian  diasporas,

stand  to  gain.  Perhaps  1.5m  refugees  have

moved  on  to  countries  farther  west,  in­

cluding Germany, Italy and France, accord­

ing  to  an  estimate  by  Gillian  Triggs of  the

United Nations refugee agency. Before the

war,  about  250,000  Ukrainians  lived  and

worked  in  Italy,  where  the  median  age  is

four  years  higher  than  in  Europe  overall

and  the  fertility  rate  is  among  the  lowest.

In the first three months of this year Aus­

tria’s  population  increased  by  half  a  per­

centage point to more than 9m; 83% of that

growth was from Ukrainian immigration.

For a region worried about demograph­

ic decline, the youthful infusion from Uk­

raine can look like a blessing, although it is

the consequence of horror. Businesses are

reporting  labour  shortages.  In  January  a

lack  of  workers  constrained  output  at  a

quarter  of  manufacturing  and  service  en­

terprises  in  the  euro  zone,  according  to  a

survey by the European Commission. Gov­

ernments  lament  that  a  shrinking  work­

force  will  have  to  support  an  ever  greater

number  of  pensioners.  The  ratio  of  work­

ing­age  Europeans  (aged  20­64)  to  those

older  than  65  is  expected  to  drop  from

three  to  one  to  less  than  two  to  one  by

2070.  That  is  the  sort  of  problem  that  can
      be relieved at least for a while by the arrival
      of able­brained and ­bodied Ukrainians. 
      But  how  long  will  they  stay?  And  will
      they be joined by their male family mem­
      bers?  That  depends  on  how  long  the  war
      lasts, and on how much damage is inflicted
      on their home country. In the Kosovo war
      of 1999, when natobombed Yugoslavia to
      prevent the brutalisation of ethnic Albani­

answhomakeupKosovo’smajority,hun­

dredsofthousandsfled,orwereforcibly

moved,toneighbouringAlbaniaandMac­

edonia.Butthisperiodofthewarlasted 78

days,afterwhichtheKosovarsquicklyre­

turned.BycontrasttheBosnianwar,which

lasted from 1992 to 1995, sent some

700,000refugeesfleeingto westernEu­

ropeandbeyond,andfarfewerreturned.

That isone reasonwhytoday thereare

thoughttobe3.2mpeopleorfewerinBos­

nia.Beforethewartherewere4m.

Fornow,Ukrainiansremaineagertore­

turnhome.Indeed,onsomerecentdays

thenumber returningacross thePolish

border, presumably to relatively secure

placessuchasKyiv,Ukraine’scapital,has

exceededthenumbergoingtheotherway.

And  some  industries  have  lost  workers  as

young Ukrainian men return home to fight

the Russian invaders. The growth of Slova­

kia’s construction sector, for example, has

been weakened by an exodus of workers. 

But  if  the  war  drags  on,  and  children

grow  accustomed  to  their  new  schools,

mothers  may  become  more  reluctant  to

head back to their former homes. That will

be all the truer if Ukraine’s economy does

not  recover,  encouraging  men  to  head

west,  some  to  rejoin  their  wives.  In  that

case,  the  unsought  addition  to  Europe’s

population  west  of  Ukraine  may  become

long­lasting. And, if governments are suc­

cessful in encouraging newcomers to find

jobs that suittheir skills, they will contrib­

ute to the prosperity of their hosts. 

Plenty of countries will miss out. Croa­

tia,  whose  population  has  dropped  by

600,000 since 1991 to 3.9m, according to its

latest  census,  is  unlikely  to  attract  many

Ukrainians. Roughly 11,000 had arrived by

early April. Russophile Serbia, whose pop­

ulation  has  slumped  by  a  tenth  since  the

mid­1990s  to  6.9m,  is  also  unlikely  to  ap­

peal to Ukrainians in large numbers. 

The  gains  from  the  influx,  where  they

happen, may not be long­lasting. The big­

gest  influence  on  families’  willingness  to

have  children  is  their  confidence  in  the

economy.  Births  in  Europe  plummeted

after  the  onset  of  the  pandemic  but  reco­

vered  as  governments  lifted  lockdowns

and pumped money into their economies.

Mr Putin’s aggression, and the rise in infla­

tion to which it has contributed, has deli­

vered a fresh blow to people’s confidence. 

In March economic uncertainty among

consumers reached its highest level on re­

cord, according to the European Commis­

sion. Few people may be inclined for their

families to grow. None may be more reluc­

tant than Ukrainian women, among whom

birth  rates  were  already  low,  who  have

been  separated  from  their  husbands  and

driven from their homes. The Balkan wars

robbed the region of some of the bestand

brightest of a generation, and their descen­

dants. Ukraine may face a similar fate.n

Ports in the storm

Ukrainian refugee arrivals, m

Sources:UNHCR;UNPopulationDivision

Slovakia

Hungary

Romania

Moldova

Poland

543210

3.5

2.3

1.8

8.8

6.4

Forecastremaining

refugeesby Dec 2    22,

%oftotalpopulation

At Apr 2rd 2022 Dec 2022 forecast

Italy could do with some newcomers