The Sunday Times - UK (2022-05-01)

(Antfer) #1

The Sunday Times May 1, 2022 V2 9


BUSINESS


W


ith wages rising, 11 million
job openings in search of
workers, quit rates and job
security high and the
unemployment rate low, it
is clear that bargaining
power has shifted from
bosses to workers. But the
implications of that shift for the labour
market as an institution are less clear.
In the wonderful 1954 musical, The
Pajama Game, the leader of a strike in
the pajama factory announces, “I
figured it out.” The seven-and-a-half-
cents per hour raise the strikers are
demanding “doesn’t buy a hell of a lot ...
but give it to me every hour, 40 hours
every week, and that’s enough for me to
be living like a king.” With “a pencil and
a pad” he figured that in five years, with
overtime, he would have $852.74,
enough to enable him to buy a washing
machine, vacuum cleaner, 40-inch
television set, a year’s supply of petrol,
and carpet the living room. A reasonable
conclusion, since an $852.74 raise would
buy $8,841 (£7,000) in stuff today.
That was then, this is now. With
spending on services rising sharply
relative to spending on stuff, and with
much of the latter provided by imports,
entrants into the workforce are more
likely to write programs than stitch
pajamas. With women making up 47 per
cent of the workforce compared with
37 per cent some 50 years ago, their
needs carry greater weight. With
millions of working-age men
disappearing from the workforce, this is
not your father’s, or Biden’s father’s
labour market.
These changes have consequences for
the labour market. Workers want
adequate pay but, in addition, what is
called a better work-life balance, a term
sufficiently vague to test the
imaginations of corporate bureaucrats.
They do not want to bear the indignities
of crime-ridden public transportation
systems or the frustrations of traffic jams
to return to the office (RTO) after tasting
the joys of work from home (WFH).
Which means that a labour market
that is historically designed to bring the
demand for and the supply of labour
into balance at wage rates that allow
businesses to earn reasonable profits,
and workers to have a decent standard
of living, is no longer fit for purpose.
Despite wage increases, many
workers are eyeing union membership
for the first time in decades. Despite
bidding wages up at a rapid rate,
employers face an exasperating worker
shortage. Unhappiness with labour-
market outcomes reigns supreme.
In part, this is because employers are
now competing with “such stuff that
dreams are made on”. Nearly 5.4 million
applications to form new businesses
were filed last year, 1.9 million more than
in 2019, the year before Covid landed
here from China. That is only one of
several ways in which the supply side of
the labour market is changing at a pace
that the major institutions on the
demand side are having difficulty
accommodating.
In part, the failure of the labour
market to function to greater satisfaction
is due to the fact that many corporations
do not have the systems needed to hire

in a labour market that now includes a
geographically scattered labour force,
which the hiring officer has never met
face-to-face, except at an occasional
alcohol-infused corporate retreat, an
anachronistic description from the days
when there were well-attended
workplaces from which to “retreat”.
Consider the difficulty of determining
who gets promoted and who does not,
who gets a raise and who does not, how
to supervise WFH employees at a time
when quit rates are at a record high, how
to manage recruitment in an era in
which half of job hunters rely on online
listings for openings and information
about prospective employers.
And the even more difficult problem
of figuring out how to meet the
multidimensional demands of a new-age
proletariat. Apple pays its retail

Irwin Stelzer American Account


workforce an above-average starting
wage. According to one of the leaders of
the organising drive in its Atlanta store,
“Apple is a profoundly positive place to
work, but we know that the company
can better live up to their ideals.”
Presumably, the company’s
negotiator will need expert advice on
just how to live up to those ideals. And,
along with his Starbucks counterpart,
from still others to advise him how to
avoid antagonising those companies’
largely liberal and worker-sympathetic
customer bases while turning down
economically unacceptable quality-of-
life demands from a newly emboldened,
more diverse, workforce.
There’s more. Hispanics have
increased from 8.5 per cent of the
workforce in 1990 to a reported 18.0 per
cent in 2020, and black workers from
5.16 per cent to 12.6 per cent. The labour
market, designed to deal primarily with
wage-setting, is now a battlefield on
which government and employers, with
the help of lawyers and economists,
battle to determine whether any groups
are being discriminated against. That
won’t change when bargaining power
inevitably shifts back to employers. Nor
will demand cool for HR managers, who
now number close to 900,000, earning a
median annual salary of $126,320.
[email protected]

Irwin Stelzer is a business adviser

Union organisers


at Apple know that


it can better live


up to their ideals


Once, debt at 40%


of GDP was seen as


a safe level. It’s a


different era now


T


here was a time when it was
impossible to get away from
Covid-19 — it dominated the
news agenda for nearly two
years. One day we will be able
to tell our grandchildren that
we were there when Professor
Chris Whitty said: “Next slide,
please.” The pandemic, of course, had a
huge human cost, which continues.
The latest estimates from the Office
for National Statistics are that there have
been 174,413 deaths involving Covid
since March 2020 in England and Wales,
and 133,623 “excess” deaths. For the
latest reporting week, to April 15, there
were 1,003 deaths involving Covid, in
644 of which it was the underlying
cause. Other figures, from the
government’s coronavirus dashboard —
now of less interest because mass testing
has ended — suggest 2,297 UK deaths
within 28 days of a positive test in the
latest seven days.
As well as the human cost, there has
been a significant economic cost. You
might think that is all behind us. Now
that the unemployment rate is slightly
below pre-pandemic levels, at just
3.8 per cent, and gross domestic product
has recovered to where it was on the eve
of the pandemic, it would be easy to
conclude that we have quickly returned
to normal. But there are still nearly
600,000 fewer people in work than
there were, and some of the other
economic effects are enduring.
That includes the impact on the
public finances, and this is a good time
to be looking at that. A few days ago,
official figures covering the 2021-22 fiscal
year were published. They showed that,
while the budget deficit came down
sharply compared with 2020-21, when
most of the damage to the public
finances was done, it was both above
official forecasts and historically high.
The deficit fell from £317.6 billion in
2020-21 to £151.8 billion in 2021-22, thus
dropping from the highest to the third
highest on record (the second highest
was during the financial crisis). For once
the official forecaster, the Office for
Budget Responsibility (OBR), was too
optimistic, the deficit coming in a hefty
£24 billion above the forecast it made
only last month, though the gap should
narrow as later data comes in.
The latest figures also provide a
running score for the effect of the
pandemic, and the economic measures
brought in to counter it, on government
debt. At the end of March, roughly the
end of the 2021-22 fiscal year, public
sector net debt was more than
£2.3 trillion and equivalent to 96.2 per
cent of gross domestic product.
Two years earlier, at the end of March
2020, the debt was nearly £1.8 trillion, or
82.8 per cent of GDP. I could have gone
back a little earlier, given that the
economy was already succumbing to
Covid during March 2020, and we were
already in the first lockdown, but the
significant debt increases only came
after that.
Both sets of numbers are large and the
later ones are considerably larger than
those earlier. Government debt at the
end of March this year was £551 billion
bigger than two years earlier. Relative to
GDP, it rose from just over 80 per cent to

knocking on the door of 100 per cent.
Most of this increase in debt was due
to the pandemic — both the effects of a
profound economic shock to public
expenditure and tax revenues, and the
cost of the measures introduced by the
chancellor in response to that shock.
There was also, embarrassingly for the
Treasury, as the guardian of the public
purse, widespread waste and fraud.
Purchases of unusable personal
protective equipment and tales of
suitcases of money at airports
containing bounce back loans do not
suggest a tightly run ship.
The debt in cash terms would have
gone up anyway, but not by nearly as
much. In February 2020, the consensus
among economists was that public
borrowing — the deficit —would be
between £50 billion and £55 billion in
both 2020-21 and 2021-22. The debt
would have risen by £100 billion or so
even if there had been no pandemic.

almost double its level a year earlier. The
OBR, which got this one pretty much
right, predicts a further rise to
£83 billion this year, 2022-23.
Most of the increase reflects the
impact of higher inflation on index-
linked gilts, on which the return is tied to
the retail price index. And, while the
money does not have to be paid out until
the bonds mature, it still reflects the cost
of servicing government debt. This
year’s even higher bill is also largely an
inflation effect, though also embodies
higher interest rates.
The inflation effect will subside if
inflation drops back, as the official
forecasters expect it to do. But the public
finances remain vulnerable to higher
borrowing costs and new economic
shocks. It is not that long ago, under
Gordon Brown’s 1997-2007
chancellorship, that 40 per cent of GDP
was thought to be the safe level of
government debt and was embodied in
Labour’s fiscal rules. In very many
respects, we are now in a different era.

PS
Towards the end of 2020, I gave a talk —
online, naturally — to an association of
businesses whose role was to supply
independent garages. The mood was
very glum, not just because of Covid but
because their business had been hard hit
by the government’s decision to extend
by six months the MoT tests on vehicles
that had a test due between March 30
and July 31 that year.
The six-month grace period made
sense in view of the disruption to garage
services, and the fact that people were
driving less when restricted on how
much they could travel — except when it
was to Barnard Castle. But it made things
very difficult for that part of the motor
trade, independent garages
predominantly servicing older vehicles,
for which the annual MoT and oil-change
service is their lifeblood.
I thought of this the other day when
news emerged of ideas being tossed
around the cabinet table for easing the
cost-of-living burden, one of which was
to extend the interval for MoTs from 12
to 24 months.
Two years is the interval in many
other countries, though tests are often
tougher, and there is no doubt that cars
have become more reliable in the 60 or
so years since the annual MoT test was
introduced.
I know people like me are meant to
take sides, but I genuinely have a mixed
view on this one. On the one hand, it will
clearly be dangerous if more people are
driving around on bald tyres or with
dodgy brakes, or churning out more
toxic emissions than they should be.
Independent garages will lose business,
and for some that will be critical.
On the other, many drivers are
required to fork out £54.85 for a test they
do not really need and, given that
garages are pretty good at finding things
that need to be done, to pay for repairs
to parts they did not know they had.
One thing is clear. Whatever the
merits of these and other fairly weak
ideas that were being discussed around
the cabinet table, they are not a solution
to the cost-of-living crisis.
[email protected]

That leaves about £450 billion as the
cost of the pandemic to the public
finances, in terms of the addition to
government debt. It is a significant sum.
It is not as much as in a war, to which the
pandemic has sometimes been
compared. The Second World War
increased government debt from 137 per
cent to 252 per cent of GDP, roughly
equivalent in today’s prices to an
increase from £3.3 trillion to £6.1 trillion.
There were, however, clear routes to
reducing the debt burden after the war —
through demobilisation, lower defence
spending and economic growth. The
debt fell from 252 per cent of GDP to just
22 per cent over the next 45 years. Now
there are no such mechanisms. We face a
future of unfavourable demographics
and, it seems, low growth.
It is, of course, too soon to close the
books on the pandemic. There will be
costs for a number of years in clearing
the NHS backlog, which is the main
reason for the national insurance hike.
There will also be costs in the catch-up
for pupils, though much less has so far
been allocated to that.
In the meantime, there is one of the
chancellor’s big fears — that a
combination of high debt and rising
borrowing costs will mean a soaring debt
interest bill. It was one reason why, in his
spring statement in March, he chose not
to splash the cash, even at significant
personal political cost.
A standout number from the latest
official figures was that debt interest rose
to a record £69.9 billion in 2021-22,

Central government debt interest

£100bn

Public sector debt

300% of GDP

GOVERNMENT DEBT IS AT A 60YEAR HIGH ...


... AND DEBT INTEREST IS RISING FAST


Source: ONS

Sources: ONS, OBR

60

0

80

20

40

1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

201617

200

100

0

201718 201819 201920 202021 202 12 2 202 223

Forecast

GreatDepressionWW2

David Smith Economic Outlook


Labour market is


not fit for purpose


£450bn and counting – the


cost in debt of the pandemic


HSBC itself has been in Hong Kong since
the aftermath of the Opium Wars.
Trading through local difficulties is
second nature and, if anything, gives the
bank its edge.
That’s just one reason why Ping An’s
agitation to break up the giant bank
makes less sense than you’d first think.
It’s true, HSBC does infuriatingly miss
financial targets, and has been
stubbornly bureaucratic. But smashing
the thing up is not the answer. The bulk
of its core wholesale banking customers
choose HSBC because it can facilitate
trade between and around East and
West. Split one from t’other and you
would cause an instant migration to the
US global giants Citi and JPMorgan.
One reason Asia-focused Standard
Chartered is valued so much lower than
HSBC on the London Stock Exchange is
that StanChart does not offer the
Western part of the trade jigsaw.
Trade is the most significant part of
the HSBC model, but a break up would
also hit its retail customer numbers.
Many are an international bunch, who
put up with humdrum service because
they travel a lot and like a global bank.

Another canard is that the Asian part
of a broken-up HSBC would be more
lightly regulated and less heavily
capitalised than it is currently under the
Bank of England. The truth is that Hong
Kong regulators aren’t so different from
Threadneedle Street. And as for China,
one of the finance ministry’s biggest
concerns is how thinly capitalised its
banks are — perhaps to the tune of
$200 billion-$400 billion. Regulators
there are hardly likely to give an easy
ride to a newly created “HSBC Asia”,
with operations in India, Australia and
other countries they little understand.
Added to which, the cost and
disruption of HSBC doing the splits
would be immense, just at a time when
global banks should be capitalising on an
increase in central bank interest rates.
Ping An, with its likeable boss Peter
Ma, is perfectly within its rights to call
for a debate on HSBC’s future. There are
arguments to be had about how to
improve what has been a perennial
underperformer. But the simplistic idea
of a break up would destroy as much
value as it creates.
Oliver Shah is away

elderly relatives. But many have
dropped out of work simply because
they can afford to. A generation of low
interest rates means they have accrued
unprecedented wealth in their
properties and investments.
Again, the prospect of higher interest
rates and recession could jolt them out
of their sense of ease. Declines in
technology sector shares have begun to
bite into pension portfolios this year.
Property prices are starting to cool, too.
The generation that delights in

T


hey call them the Missing
Million. Britain’s workforce has
some 1.1 million fewer toilers
than before Covid. Broadly
speaking, during the pandemic,
a third of the million retired, a
third fled back to their home
countries, and a third were
younger workers who dropped out for a
career break.
The result can be seen in pubs and
restaurants across the country this busy
bank holiday weekend, with many either
closed altogether due to staff shortages
or operating a limited service.
Office for National Statistics data
shows that nearly all sectors are affected
by labour shortages. In each of
transport, mining, finance, energy,
education and media, more than 50,000
vacancies are being advertised.
Healthcare and hospitality have more
than 150,000 roles needing to be filled.
The resulting inability of companies
to satisfy demand for goods and services
is one reason Britain is set for the slowest
economic growth in the G7 this year.
The question is, how long will it last?
Some experts argue this Great

Resignation is the future: that younger
workers will never again be as hungry to
forge forth on the career paths, while
their “OK Boomer” parents will
disappear from the workplace for good.
I’m not so sure of either.
Those in their twenties and thirties
who quit working as a lifestyle choice do
so because they have never experienced
the terror of a monster recession and
mass unemployment. All they have
known is readily available work and — in
recent years — the prospect of a healthy
pay rise every time they swap jobs.
When recession does come — as
seems likely pretty soon — that relaxed
attitude will change. We may not see an
unemployment crisis as in previous
downturns, but jobs will disappear.
Those who can afford it may shelter
from the storm by returning to
education, but most will run in the
direction of whatever work there is, and
stay there when they find it.
And what of the 700,000 or so in their
50s and 60s who’ve joined the missing
million? Long-term health issues seem to
be a significant factor here, stemming
from Covid or the need to care for

Job vacancies, January to March 2022

216,000

170,000

164,000

131,000

94,000

88,000

73,000

73,000

Health and social work

Car trade

Hospitality

Science and tech

Manufacturing

Support services/admin

IT and comms

Education

reminding the young of the days when
mortgages were at 14 per cent will feel a
twinge of the old fear again and put off
their retirement.
With any luck, a long overdue reset of
property prices could mean more
younger people getting on the housing
ladder. A hefty mortgage to worry about
is the surest way to stop them dropping
out of the rat race.

Breaking up is hard to do for HSBC
As China flexes its muscles against the
West, it’s easy to declare that
corporations cannot straddle both
London and Beijing.
Take HSBC: when it complies with the
demands of authorities in China that the
West doesn’t like, the board gets
brickbats in London and Washington.
When it complies with western
regulators in ways China disapproves of,
it gets spanked in Beijing.
China’s ambivalent stance over Russia
only makes the tensions worse. But that
does not make it impossible to balance
the two. British companies have
diplomatically juggled ties in difficult
countries since the days of the Empire.

Jim Armitage


Say farewell to the Great Resignation.


Recession will make work attractive

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