38 United States The Economist May 7th 2022
divisions on abortion have remained fairly
stable (see Graphic detail).
That suggests the immediate political
impact may be limited. Extreme polarisa
tion means that those Americans most ex
ercised by the issue, whether prolife or
prochoice, are already sorted into their
supportive political party. Might suburban
women respond by abandoning the Re
publican Party? Perhaps, but such an exo
dus has already been under way since Do
nald Trump’s presidency. Against this, Re
publicans would be able to count on the
motivation of an evangelical base elated
with judicial victory and on surprising
gains among Hispanic and AfricanAmeri
can voters, who are more socially conser
vative than the collegeeducated whites
defecting to the Democrats.
Another strain of wishful thinking
among Democrats concerns thecoherence
of their opponents. The hope thatjudicial
power would overturn Roehasfordecades
bonded seemingly disparate alliesinthe
conservative legal movement:thelargely
evangelical religious right, thetuxedoed
Rockefeller Republicans and theTrumpist
nationalists. Having carried outitsmis
sion, the fellowship of the rightmightdis
solve. For now, this seems unlikely.White
evangelicals are not latent Democratshin
dered only by their disdain forabortion.
Polling by the Public Religion ResearchIn
stitutefinds that only 11% trustMrBiden;
more than twice as many, 23%,believein
the QAnon conspiracy theory.
Instead, perceived Democraticfeckless
ness may demotivate the party’sownsup
porters. In theory, a Democratcontrolled
Congress could pass a law codifyinga na
tional right to abortion, preemptingthe
states. Mr Schumer has called fora voteon
exactly such a bill. But it will fail.Topassit
would require unified supportfor over
turning the filibuster and legislatinga na
tionwide right to abortion. JoeManchin,
the pivotal Democratic swing vote, dis
agrees with both notions.
The likely result of all thisisthatthe
politics of abortion will grow evenmorefe
brile. In Missouri, a state withonlyone
functioning abortion clinic, a legislator
named Mary Elizabeth Colemanhasintro
duced a new style of abortion bill.Itwould
ban the distribution of abortion pills
(which are used more often thansurgical
abortions) and allow private lawsuits
against anyone who knowingly helps a
woman go out of state to obtaintheproce
dure. “Missouri women are beingtargeted
by those who are wanting to profitoffof
abortion. You see billboards across the
state. Women are being harmed out of
state,” she says.
Some thought, incorrectly,thattheSu
preme Court had settled the issuewhenit
decided Roe in 1973. It’s equallyunlikely
that the issue will be settled now.n
Weaponssupplies
The depleting arsenal of democracy
A
s london wasbeing bombed during
the Blitz, Franklin Roosevelt delivered
a “fireside chat” over the radio on Decem
ber 29th 1940 that still resonates today.
America, the president said, had to become
“the great arsenal of democracy”, both to
help those fighting the Nazis and to protect
itself. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbour a
year later, America’s factories went into
full wartime production. The car industry
in Detroit took up much of the burden:
Oldsmobile made cannon shells, Cadillac
produced tanks and howitzers, Chrysler
made Browning machineguns. Ford built
a huge factory to roll out b24 bombers at a
rate of one an hour. One of its workers
might have inspired the song and poster of
“Rosie the Riveter”, now an iconic image.
With war raging in Ukraine, President
Joe Biden is casting himself as a latterday
Roosevelt. America will not fight directly
but is determined to help Ukraine “win”.
On April 28th he asked Congress for an ex
tra $33bn to respond to the crisis, on top of
$13.6bn approved earlier this year. The new
request includes about $20bn in military
assistance to Ukraine and European allies.
“The cost of this fight is not cheap, but cav
ing to aggression is going to be more costly
if we allow it to happen,” he declared.
Can America’s arms industry respond?
It must help supply not only Ukraine but
also European allies that are rushing to re
arm and America itself, which must re
plenish its stocks and worry about the risk
of greatpower conflict. “One of the great
success stories of this war is that we have
been able to supply the Ukrainians with
large numbers of munitions,” says Thomas
Mahnken of the Centre for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, a thinktank in
Washington. “My question is: who is going
to supply the United States? Nobody.”
America has been by far Ukraine’s big
gest armourer. Since 2018 it has sold or do
nated 7,000odd Javelin antitank mis
siles. America has sent 14,000 other anti
armour systems, 1,400 Stinger antiaircraft
missiles, 700 Switchblade loitering muni
tions, 90 howitzers with 183,000 155mm
shells, 16 mi17 helicopters, 200 armoured
personnel carriers and more. And it has
marshalled allies to provide military
equipment, often of exSoviet vintage.
Most of these weapons have come from
stockpiles. Factories may not be able to
raise production quickly. Take the Javelin.
America does not release details of its
stock of weapons. But according to budget
documents, its army has bought around
34,500 Javelins since they went into ser
vice in 1996. Mark Cancian of the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, anoth
er thinktank, reckons that it has used
12,50017,500 for training and testing. That
would leave 17,00022,000 in stock at the
end of 2021. So the 7,000 Javelins given to
Ukraine may account for a third or more of
the army’s stock (see chart on next page).
His calculation excludes about 2,400 Jave
lins bought by the marines, and perhaps
5,000 expended in Iraq and Afghanistan.
On May 3rd Mr Biden visited the factory
in Troy, Alabama, where the Javelins are as
sembled. It produces 2,100 of them a year.
It would thus take three or four years to re
WASHINGTON, DC
The war in Ukraine raises worries about America’s ability to arm its friends