40 United States The Economist May 7th 2022
right”. “Establishment” Republicans, he
said,haveconnivedtosendAmericanjobs
to China while doing nothing to stop
Americans getting addicted to opiates.
Democrats“activelyencourage” Mexican
cartelstoimportfentanyl,evenastheytell
childrenthereare“42genders”.MrVance
saidbothgroupsoughttobesenttojail.
Whythissortofrhetoricissopersua
siveamongOhio’sRepublicanvotersisun
clear.It istruethatopioidaddictionisa ca
tastropheinthestate.Butillegalimmigra
tionisnot.Lessthan5%ofOhio’spopula
tionareforeignborn,one ofthelowest
ratesinthecountry.Andyetitseemsto
haveralliedthemajority ofthosevoters
whoturnedout(allbutoneoftheseven
candidatesespouseda similarcreed).Ev
eryvoteryourcorrespondentinterviewed
outsidevariouspollingplacesmentioned
illegalimmigrantsastheirprimarycon
cern,shortlyfollowedbyinflation.
WhatdidnotstopMrVance’svictory
washispreviousincarnation,asa darling
ofliberal publications anda thoughtful
criticofMrTrumpafterhisbook“Hillbilly
Elegy”cameoutin2016.Hisopponents
plastered theairwaves withunfortunate
quotes, including a suggestion that Mr
Trumpmight become“America’sHitler”.
Nomatter.“Hemadea mistakeandhead
mitsit,”saidRobFyte,anotherpensioner
inMason,aftervotingforMrVance.Hav
ingbecome famousforamemoirabout
howworkingclasspeoplefromtheAppa
lachiansoftenlookforoutsiderstoblame
fortheirproblems,MrVancehasseamless
lyswitchedtoarguingthatoutsidersareto
blamefortheirproblems.
Willvotersinthegeneralelectionin
Novemberbeasforgiving?Thewinnerof
theDemocraticprimary,TimRyan,a con
gressmanfromYoungstown,isalsorun
ningonChinabashingpopulism,andmay
havea chance.Butin 2020 Ohiowentfor
MrTrumpbyeightpoints.Mostprobably,
theproudHillbillywillgoontotakehis
apocalypticmessagetoWashington.n
California
America, only less so
W
allace stegner, a novelist, once
called California “America...only
more so”. To judge by population estimates
released on May 2nd, the state is still Amer
ica, but slightly less so. The population fell
to 39.2m in the year to January 2022,
400,000 lower than in 2020 (see chart on
next page). In 1990, the number of Califor
nians had been rising by a robust 2.5% a
year. The biggest contribution to the de
cline came from migration. In 2021, the net
change (people moving out of state minus
those moving in) was twice as large as the
number of covid deaths and four times the
population’s natural change (the excess of
deaths over births). Big cities have been hit
hardest; the population of Los Angeles
County has fallen for the past four years.
Even if these declines were no worse
than average—and national demographic
trends are slowing, too—they might seem
worse in a state where, as its governor once
said, “the future happens here first”. In fact
California’s demography is worse than av
erage. The state’s total fertility rate (tfr, an
estimate of the number of children women
will bear over their lifetimes) fell from 2.2
in 2006 to 1.5 in 2020, more than in Amer
ica as a whole, where the fall was from 2.1 to
1.6. The tfris one of the most important
indicators of future population trends.
Fertility has been depressed, in part, sug
gests the state demographer, Walter
Schwarm, because of the larger share of
foreign immigrants now coming from
South Korea, Japan and China. East Asians
have brought their low fertility with them.
As a result, argues Joe Mathews, a writer
and commentator, the state’s demography
is now at odds with Californians’ sense of
their home state as “a place where we can
play in the sun” (to quote the Beach Boys).
Youthfulness, attractiveness to migrants
and diversity: all three are eroding.
California is still young, but less so. The
state’s median age, 37.3, is a year and a half
below the national average but is catching
up, having risen by two years in 201020.
The over65s were 11% of the population in
2010 but will almost double to 19% by 2030.
The state’s 88yearold very senior senator,
Dianne Feinstein, is representative of her
constituents in this respect.
California is no longer the migrant
magnet it was. Between 2000 and 2020, it
lost roughly 3m people to other parts of the
country. In recent years the decline has
been exacerbated by the pandemic and
border controls, both of which have re
stricted foreign migrants. In 2000 Texas
was 60% the size of California in terms of
population; now it is threequarters,
thanks in part to an influx of Californians.
Drought, wildfires and relatively poor
schools all played roles in the exodus, but
dominating everything is the cost of hous
ing. In 2019 median house prices in Califor
nia were 184% higher than those in Texas.
Dowell Myers, a demographer at the Uni
versity of Southern California, argues that
exorbitant housing costs also explain Cali
fornia’s falling fertility, since couples who
want children go to states where they can
afford a family home—and even its relative
youth, since large numbers of older Cali
fornians are cashing out and buying big re
tirement homes elsewhere.
As a result, California has lost a compo
nent of its diversity: the sense that it is a
place where people from all over America
come to make good. Ethnically, it has not
changed much: 27% of Californians are
foreignborn, the highest share in America
and twice the national rate. It is one of only
two states (with New Mexico) where there
are more Latinos (39%) than whites (37%).
In absolute terms, it has more AsianAmer
icans and Pacific Islanders than anywhere,
even Hawaii. And it will become less white
in future because, though whites are two
LOS ANGELES
The new demography of the Golden State is at odds with the old California Dream
As much of a mix, but less of a magnet