The Economist May 7th 2022 Middle East & Africa 47
Africa’sfuelmarket
Pumped dry
I
n burundi,driversaresodesperate for
fuel that they sleep on forecourts of pet
rol stations. Senegal has so little jet fuel
that Air France’s flight from the capital, Da
kar, to Paris has been stopping in the Ca
nary Islands to fill up. Johannesburg has
the same problem, which has caused Unit
ed Airlines to cancel some flights from
New York. From Kenya, which recently suf
fered its worst petrol shortage in a decade,
to Lagos, where queues outside petrol sta
tions backed onto motorways, and Camer
oon, where thousands of lorries have been
stranded without diesel, Africa has been
short of the lifeblood of modern econo
mies. “Everywhere, everyone is scrambling
for diesel,” laments Anibor Kragha of the
African Refiners and Distributors Associa
tion, an industry group.
The economic costs of shortages are
huge. They bring commerce to a grinding
halt, shut the millions of businesses that
have to generate their own electricity and
force holidaymakers to cancel trips for lack
of flights. This is a blow to tourism, a large
contributor to gdpin many African coun
tries. The social impact is large, too. Hospi
tals cannot get drugs and ambulances are
immobilised. All this makes politicians
jumpy. Anger at shortages can quickly
erupt in the streets.
Demand for fuel surged across the
world last year as economies recovered
from covid19. Yet for the first time in 30
years global refining capacity fell, causing
fuel prices to rise. Russia’s invasion of Uk
raine pushed them higher still. In most
places fuel has remained available, if ex
pensive. But not in Africa, which is going
through its worst supply crisis in 40 years,
according to Pierre Barbe, who runs the Af
rica business at Vitol, the world’s biggest
independent oil trader.
The shortages are not simply the result
of higher prices that have made fuel unaf
fordable to poorer buyers in many parts of
Africa. They have also been caused by sev
eral other market changes that particularly
affect the continent, says Kristine Petro
syan of the International Energy Agency
(iea), an intergovernmental thinktank.
Fuel traders generally use financial
markets to lessen the risk of price fluctua
tions. But they have to spend much more
(and tie up more working capital) hedging
when prices are high and volatile. Import
ers to Africa are often smaller than those in
richer regions, and have tighter balance
sheets. To conserve capital many simply
import less fuel.
The problem is being aggravated by a
turn in the futures market: the price for de
liveries of oil at a future date has fallen far
below that for immediate delivery. In more
usual times traders would park dozens of
full oil tankers (known as “floaters”) off the
west African coast, where they would wait
for higher prices. Now traders want to un
load them as quickly as possible and send
them to Asia through the Suez canal, avoid
ing Africa altogether.
Many subSaharan countries are partic
ularly vulnerable because they generally
buy in small amounts from floaters or
tankers sailing by. Whereas many rich
countries hold a 90day supply in reserve,
few subSaharan countries have any such
backup. It is clear that there is little storage
capacity in the region, although data on
this are scant.
A second vulnerability is that subSaha
ran countries refine little oil domestically.
Many of their refineries are badly run and
operate far below capacity or are too small
to compete. Refinery output in subSaha
ran Africa has fallen by half over the past
decade, even as oil demand in the region
has risen by 19%, according to the iea. Sub
Saharan Africa now imports about three
quarters of its refined products on average,
a greater share than any other region. That
leaves it deeply exposed to external shocks.
West Africa is especially vulnerable. Sene
gal, for example, is short on fuel in part be
cause the country’s sole refinery has been
shut for maintenance.
Having little refining capacity and bare
ly anything in reserve is risky at the best of
times. In many African countries poor lo
gistics, bad management and distorting
subsidies regularly cause supply shocks.
Many African ports can only receive ships
with a shallow draft, forcing big tankers to
offload into little ones. They are also heavi
ly congested, exacerbating delays. Nige
ria’s recent shortages emerged after the au
thorities blocked the sale of 350,000
tonnes of petrol: it contained too much
methanol. Exactly who messed up is hotly
contested but, with tiny reserves, motor
ists were soon running dry. In Kenya the
government subsidises petrol but does so
clumsily, worsening fuel shortages. It was
recently late paying the equivalent of
$112m in subsidies to retailers who were al
ready struggling with a shortage of work
ing capital because of high prices.
Things may soon get even worse. Big oil
traders are reducing purchases of Russian
oil to comply with European sanctions that
take effect on May 15th. This will further
cut the flow to Africa of fuel refined in Eu
rope from Russian oil.
In the long run much hope—and cash—
is invested in a big refinery being built in
Nigeria by the Dangote Group. Though the
project is years behind schedule, it is ex
pected to be completed later this year. Yet
the project is an exception to the trend of
declining capacity. Africa also needs deep
er strategic reserves of fuel to weather both
global shocks and local troubles. “Maybe
this will be a wakeup call, the way the
1970s were to Europe,” saystheiea’s Ms Pe
trosyan, “because it is clearthatthis situa
tion can repeat in the future.” n
P ARIS
Why fuel shortages are spreading
across Africa
Dual fuel
long after their deaths. (Their successor,
Hosni Mubarak, a man perhaps best re
membered for being overthrown, may not
merit a biopic.) Mr Sisi’s turn on the small
screen comes at the height of his powers:
he forced through constitutional amend
ments in 2019 that all but guarantee he will
rule until 2030. This was a lavish propa
ganda effort, meant to rally Egyptians just
when many have grown disenchanted.
Six years after it struck a $12bn deal with
the imf, Egypt has gone back for another
loan, worried about how soaring food and
energy prices will hurt its budget. Poverty
has risen since Mr Sisi took office. Endemic
problems—shoddy education and health
care, urban chaos, rampant inequality and
corruption—are unfixed. The president’s
boosters say he saved Egypt from a “dark
tunnel” of Islamist rule. But the country
has not quite emerged into sunlit uplands.
on, the network that aired the series,
has not released viewing figures. Egyptians
of various political hues seem to have
started watching the show in large num
bers, out of patriotic fervour or a desire to
chuckle at propaganda, but few appear to
have watched more than a couple of epi
sodes. Journalists were urged to write puf
fy articles to big up the ratings. Perhaps
some Egyptians wanted to relivethe events
of that summer. Nine years later, most
have more pressing concerns.n