The Economist May 7th 2022 53
China
Foreignpolicy
Base instincts
I
n august 1942 an Americanled task
force landed on Guadalcanal, the largest
of the Solomon Islands, for an offensive
that would turn the tide in the Pacific war.
The campaign dislodged Japanese troops,
thwarted their plans to sever American
supply lines to Australia and New Zealand,
and gave the Allies a vital platform for later
battles that helped vanquish Japan.
Small wonder, then, that American and
allied nerves were rattled when it emerged
in late March that China, their new Pacific
rival, was signing a security deal with the
Solomons that could give it a military foot
hold there. Over the past month, hurried
visits from American and Australian offi
cials prompted denials from China and the
Solomons that a Chinese base was in the
offing. Still, on April 27th an Australian
minister predicted that China was “very
likely” to send troops to the Solomons.
The exact contents of the deal have yet
to be made public. America and its regional
allies have promised fresh diplomatic en
gagement and threatened unspecified con
sequences if the agreement leads to any
substantial Chinese military presence. So
far, though, the saga represents a win for
China—with important qualifications.
China still has just one military base
abroad, a naval facility opened in 2017 in
Djibouti. But it is accelerating and broad
ening its quest for more. American and al
lied officials believe it has approached at
least five countries since 2018 and consi
dered a dozen others as potential hosts (see
map on next page). Whether the Solomons
deal translates into a Chinese base remains
unclear. And if it does, the strategic value
of such an isolated outpost is debatable.
Nonetheless, some who track China’s
efforts predict more such deals in the com
ing years and say that America and its al
lies should focus on limiting their utility
rather than trying to outbid China on each.
The alternative is “a game of global whack
amole”, says Isaac Kardon of the usNaval
War College. “I think part of it is just adjust
ing to the reality that the pla(People’s Lib
eration Army) is going to be more global,
and thinking about ways to make their as
sets vulnerable.”
The skirmishing over the Solomons be
gan in March when a draft of the deal was
leaked online. It said the Solomons could
ask China to send police and soldiers to
help maintain social order, provide hu
manitarian relief and conduct “other
tasks” agreed on by the two sides. China
could, “according to its own needs” and
with local approval, send its ships to stop
over, according to the draft. It also said that
neither side could make the contents pub
lic without the other agreeing.
Soon after the leak, Australia, which has
a similar, though transparent, agreement
with the Solomons, rushed two intelli
gence chiefs to the country and made a
public appeal for the government there not
to sign the Chinese deal. Manasseh Soga
vare, the prime minister of the Solomons,
signed it anyway, saying he needed to di
versify his country’s security partnerships.
America then dispatched Kurt Camp
bell, who oversees IndoPacific affairs in
the White House, and other senior officials
on an islandhopping tour of the region
culminating in the Solomons. Mr Camp
bell made several commitments, including
a promise to expedite the reopening of the
American embassy in the Solomons,
which closed in 1993, and to start a strategic
dialogue with the government there.
China wants to increase its military presence abroad. How concerned should
America and its allies be?
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