54 China TheEconomistMay7th 2022
Mr Campbell issued a warning, too. If
any steps were made to establish a Chinese
military installation or permanent pres
ence in the Solomons, America would “re
spond accordingly”, the White House said
after his meetings, without explaining
what that might entail. Scott Morrison,
Australia’s prime minister, added a simi
larly vague threat, saying a Chinese base in
the Solomons would cross “a red line”.
Ports in a storm
As China seeks to protect its worldwide in
terests and challenge American military
dominance in Asia, it can already rely to
some extent on a global network of over 90
ports that are partly or wholly owned or op
erated by Chinese firms. Those are fine for
refuelling, replenishing supplies and re
pairing ships in peacetime. But it also
needs facilities in which to station uni
formed personnel and store weapons and
equipment. In the past three years alone, it
has signed a secret deal to use a Cambodian
navy base, tried to negotiate its own naval
outpost in Equatorial Guinea and secretly
begun building a military facility inside a
Chineserun port in the United Arab Emir
ates (uae), say American officials.
China also appears to have adjusted its
tactics, abandoning attempts to convince
America and its allies that such deals don’t
threaten their interests, and targeting
countries of more strategic importance to
America. Before opening its base in Dji
bouti, China insisted that it would only be
a “logistics hub” to support Chinese forces
involved in unpeacekeeping, antipiracy
and humanitarian operations. It made no
such effort to sell the Solomons deal.
One likely explanation is Chinese pique
at the recently unveiled aukuspact, under
which America and Britain will help Aus
tralia to acquire nuclear submarines. It is
part of a broader joint effort to counter Chi
na’s military ambitions. In April one of
China’s deputy foreign ministers, Xie Feng,
contrasted the Solomons agreement with
the “covert operations of certain countries,
which have put together military blocs,
stimulated an arms race and exacerbated
the risk of nuclear proliferation”.
Another difference about the Solomons
deal is the reference to Chinese forces
quelling local unrest. Chinese proponents
of overseas bases often argue that they are
needed to help protect Chinese citizens
abroad, citing evacuations from Libya in
2011 and Yemen in 2015. Still, they rarely, if
ever, suggest intervening in the host’s do
mestic affairs, which would violate what
China says is a pillar of its foreign policy.
That change no doubt reflects Chinese
authorities’ concern about the roughly
3,000 Chinese citizens in the Solomons,
who were targeted in rioting in November.
But it also paves the way for Chinese secu
rity forces—which have already trained lo
cal police in the Solomons—to intervene in
support of Mr Sogavare if violence erupts
again after an election due next year. Such
a direct Chinese intervention in a democ
racy would be unprecedented and deeply
troubling. The world has plenty of unpop
ular leaders who would welcome Chinese
help to stay in power.
For all China’s efforts to expand abroad,
the results so far have been mixed. That is
partly the result of history. America, Brit
ain and a handful of other military powers
have a global network of bases that have ex
isted for decades and are mostly legacies of
empire, the second world war and the cold
war. China has started from scratch, and
establishing even a small new base abroad
is costly and timeconsuming.
China’s challenge in some ways resem
bles that of the Soviet Union, which from
the mid1960s began a push to find over
seas bases to give its navy global reach. Ov
er the next couple of decades it negotiated
access to facilities in some 15 countries, in
cluding Mauritius, Syria and Vietnam. But
those agreements took many forms, with
some allowing fullblown bases and others
only ship repairs. Some fell through.
As with the Soviets, China’s progress is
largely dependent on local strongmen and
vulnerabletosuddenshiftsinthepolitical
landscape.TheSolomonsdealwasdriven
byMrSogavare’sconcernsabouthisown
politicalfuture—andbyhisantipathyto
wards Australia. Any Chinese military
presencewouldbefiercelyopposedbyma
nyislanders.Inapolllastyear91%said
theywouldprefertheircountrytobedip
lomaticallyalignedmorewithliberalde
mocraciesthanwithChina.
FurtherconstrainingChinaisa recent
push by America andits alliesto draw
more public attention to Chinese base
huntingandtocoordinatetheirdiplomat
icresponses.Althoughunlikelytoreverse
anyagreements, those effortsmay have
slowedChinadownbyforcinglocallead
erstodenyplansfora Chinesebase,andby
mobilising domesticorregionalopposi
tion. Observers say Chinese forces have not
yet been spotted using the Cambodian na
val base and that the uaehas halted con
struction of the alleged Chinese military
facility in its port.
China’s deal with the Solomons marks a
step towards extending its global military
presence. For the moment, though,a sec
ond overseas base of its ownremains elu
sive, let alone a global network.n
Equatorial
Guinea Sri
Lanka
Singapore
Angola
Namibia
Tanzania
Kenya
UAE
Pakistan
Myanmar
Thailand
Cambodia
Solomon
Is.
Vanuatu
Indonesia
Djibouti
CHINA
Seychelles
Tajikistan ↑
Source:TheEconomist
Country with a Chinese base
CountriesthatChinahasprobably
consideredtohosta base
Countries that China has probably
approached to host a base
Emigration
Ready to run
L
ate lastmonth China’s central propa
ganda department announced a new
campaign: “The Strong Nation’s Rejuvena
tion Has Me”. The goal of this oddsound
ing effort is to rally red spirit before the
Communist Party’s 20th congress later this
year, when Xi Jinping hopes to secure a
third term as party chief. But a different
kind of rejuvenation is trending online,
that of “run philosophy”, a coded way of
talking about emigration. Instead of using
a character that suggests running away
from China, which would antagonise state
censors, netizens have been using one that
sounds like the English word “run”, but
means something different: run(moist).
Most of Shanghai’s 25m residents have
been locked in their homes for more than a
month in order to stem an outbreak of co
vid19 in the city. Case numbers are drop
ping there, but rising in Beijing, the capi
tal, which is doing mass testing and im
posing targeted lockdowns. Business lead
ers worry about the economic impact of
China’s covid controls. Many foreigners
are leaving—and, according to online
search trends, China’s young and educated
China’s young elite are considering
moving abroad