The Economist - UK (2022-05-07)

(Antfer) #1

54 China TheEconomistMay7th 2022


Mr  Campbell  issued  a  warning,  too.  If
any steps were made to establish a Chinese
military  installation  or  permanent  pres­
ence in the Solomons, America would “re­
spond accordingly”, the White House said
after  his  meetings,  without  explaining
what  that  might  entail.  Scott  Morrison,
Australia’s  prime  minister,  added  a  simi­
larly vague threat, saying a Chinese base in
the Solomons would cross “a red line”.

Ports in a storm
As China seeks to protect its worldwide in­
terests  and  challenge  American  military
dominance  in  Asia,  it  can  already  rely  to
some extent on a global network of over 90
ports that are partly or wholly owned or op­
erated by Chinese firms. Those are fine for
refuelling,  replenishing  supplies  and  re­
pairing  ships  in  peacetime.  But  it  also
needs  facilities  in  which  to  station  uni­
formed  personnel  and  store  weapons  and
equipment. In the past three years alone, it
has signed a secret deal to use a Cambodian
navy base, tried to negotiate its own naval
outpost  in  Equatorial  Guinea  and  secretly
begun  building  a  military  facility  inside  a
Chinese­run port in the United Arab Emir­
ates (uae), say American officials. 
China also appears to have adjusted its
tactics,  abandoning  attempts  to  convince
America and its allies that such deals don’t
threaten  their  interests,  and  targeting
countries  of  more  strategic  importance  to
America.  Before  opening  its  base  in  Dji­
bouti, China insisted that it would only be
a “logistics hub” to support Chinese forces
involved  in  unpeacekeeping,  anti­piracy
and  humanitarian  operations.  It  made  no
such effort to sell the Solomons deal. 
One likely explanation is Chinese pique
at the recently unveiled aukuspact, under
which  America  and  Britain  will  help  Aus­
tralia  to  acquire  nuclear  submarines.  It  is
part of a broader joint effort to counter Chi­
na’s  military  ambitions.  In  April  one  of
China’s deputy foreign ministers, Xie Feng,
contrasted  the  Solomons  agreement  with
the “covert operations of certain countries,

which  have  put  together  military  blocs,
stimulated  an  arms  race  and  exacerbated
the risk of nuclear proliferation”.
Another difference about the Solomons
deal  is  the  reference  to  Chinese  forces
quelling local unrest. Chinese proponents
of overseas bases often argue that they are
needed  to  help  protect  Chinese  citizens
abroad,  citing  evacuations  from  Libya  in
2011 and Yemen in 2015. Still, they rarely, if
ever, suggest intervening in the host’s do­
mestic  affairs,  which  would  violate  what
China says is a pillar of its foreign policy.
That  change  no  doubt  reflects  Chinese
authorities’  concern  about  the  roughly
3,000  Chinese  citizens  in  the  Solomons,
who were targeted in rioting in November.
But it also paves the way for Chinese secu­
rity forces—which have already trained lo­
cal police in the Solomons—to intervene in
support  of  Mr  Sogavare  if  violence  erupts
again after an election due next year. Such
a direct Chinese intervention in a democ­
racy  would  be  unprecedented  and  deeply
troubling. The world has plenty of unpop­
ular  leaders  who  would  welcome  Chinese
help to stay in power. 
For all China’s efforts to expand abroad,
the results so far have been mixed. That is
partly  the  result  of  history.  America,  Brit­
ain and a handful of other military powers
have a global network of bases that have ex­
isted for decades and are mostly legacies of
empire, the second world war and the cold
war.  China  has  started  from  scratch,  and
establishing even a small new base abroad
is costly and time­consuming.
China’s challenge in some ways resem­
bles  that  of  the  Soviet  Union,  which  from
the  mid­1960s  began  a  push  to  find  over­
seas bases to give its navy global reach. Ov­
er the next couple of decades it negotiated
access to facilities in some 15 countries, in­
cluding Mauritius, Syria and Vietnam. But
those  agreements  took  many  forms,  with
some allowing full­blown bases and others
only ship repairs. Some fell through.
As with the Soviets, China’s progress is
largely dependent on local strongmen and

vulnerabletosuddenshiftsinthepolitical
landscape.TheSolomonsdealwasdriven
byMrSogavare’sconcernsabouthisown
politicalfuture—andbyhisantipathyto­
wards Australia. Any Chinese military
presencewouldbefiercelyopposedbyma­
nyislanders.Inapolllastyear91%said
theywouldprefertheircountrytobedip­
lomaticallyalignedmorewithliberalde­
mocraciesthanwithChina.
FurtherconstrainingChinaisa recent
push by America andits alliesto draw
more public attention to Chinese base­
huntingandtoco­ordinatetheirdiplomat­
icresponses.Althoughunlikelytoreverse
anyagreements, those effortsmay have
slowedChinadownbyforcinglocallead­
erstodenyplansfora Chinesebase,andby
mobilising domesticorregionalopposi­
tion. Observers say Chinese forces have not
yet been spotted using the Cambodian na­
val  base  and  that  the  uaehas  halted  con­
struction  of  the  alleged  Chinese  military
facility in its port.
China’s deal with the Solomons marks a
step  towards  extending  its  global  military
presence.  For  the  moment,  though,a  sec­
ond overseas base of its ownremains elu­
sive, let alone a global network.n

Equatorial
Guinea Sri
Lanka
Singapore
Angola

Namibia

Tanzania

Kenya

UAE

Pakistan

Myanmar
Thailand
Cambodia

Solomon
Is.
Vanuatu

Indonesia

Djibouti

CHINA

Seychelles

Tajikistan ↑

Source:TheEconomist

Country with a Chinese base

CountriesthatChinahasprobably
consideredtohosta base

Countries that China has probably
approached to host a base

Emigration

Ready to run


L


ate lastmonth  China’s  central  propa­
ganda  department  announced  a  new
campaign: “The Strong Nation’s Rejuvena­
tion Has Me”. The goal of this odd­sound­
ing  effort  is  to  rally  red  spirit  before  the
Communist Party’s 20th congress later this
year,  when  Xi  Jinping  hopes  to  secure  a
third  term  as  party  chief.  But  a  different
kind  of  rejuvenation  is  trending  online,
that  of  “run  philosophy”,  a  coded  way  of
talking about emigration. Instead of using
a  character  that  suggests  running  away
from China, which would antagonise state
censors, netizens have been using one that
sounds  like  the  English  word  “run”,  but
means something different: run(moist).
Most of Shanghai’s 25m residents have
been locked in their homes for more than a
month in order to stem an outbreak of co­
vid­19  in  the  city.  Case  numbers  are  drop­
ping  there,  but  rising  in  Beijing,  the  capi­
tal,  which  is  doing  mass  testing  and  im­
posing targeted lockdowns. Business lead­
ers  worry  about  the  economic  impact  of
China’s  covid  controls.  Many  foreigners
are  leaving—and,  according  to  online
search trends, China’s young and educated

China’s young elite are considering
moving abroad
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