56 China The Economist May 7th 2022
China’svisionforglobal security
W
ith eachday that fresh blood is shed in Ukraine, it becomes
more painfully clear that China and the West have clashing
notions of how to preserve world peace. Since President Vladimir
Putinfirst invaded his neighbour, hopeful voices in some Western
capitals have called China an ideal mediator between Russia and
Ukraine. Such optimists cite the supposed pragmatism of the
modern Chinese Communist Party. They note the ties of trade and
investment that bind the Chinese economy to Russia, Ukraine and
wider Europe, and conclude that brokering peace is in China’s self
interest. Alas, their elegant arguments cannot overcome a stark
and ugly point of difference. Most Western governments and citi
zens want Mr Putin to lose in Ukraine, and to pay an instructively
high price for his aggression. China’s rulers want the opposite.
In part, Chinese sympathy for Russia—ill concealed behind
protestations of neutrality—is explained by domestic politics. In
February President Xi Jinping and Mr Putin declared a partnership
with “no limits” between their countries. Mr Xi calls Russia’s boss
his closest friend, seeing a kindred spirit in a fellow autocrat ob
sessed with traditional values and national revival. This is a sensi
tive year, during which Mr Xi is expected to secure a third term as
party chief: an awkward time for him to be linked to a loser.
Nor does it suit China’s ruling party to concede that Russia is
committing war crimes. Chinese officials insist that America
caused Ukraine’s invasion by enlarging natoup to Russia’s bor
ders. The Chinese public is assured that the West is now prolong
ing the conflict to enrich American arms dealers, while Russian
troops are praised for their restraint. Despite these efforts to turn
reality on its head, the Chinese foreignpolicy establishment does
not deeply respect Russia, a country seen as admirably tough but
in sad decline. As Chinese scholars tell it, America and the West
may be trying to contain Russia now, but their main target is sure
ly China, a far more important country. As a result, China has self
ish reasons to root for Mr Putin to avoid paying a high price for ag
gression. Such an outcome may be the result of a Ukrainian sur
render, the crumbling of Western unity or the flopping of interna
tional sanctions. China is strikingly indifferent to Ukraine’s
suffering, but really wants to see the containment of Russia fail.
More disruptively for the world at large, China is growing morewilling to adopt Russian arguments about how to organise a global
security order. On April 21st Mr Xi presented a new “Global Securi
ty Initiative” to the Boao Forum for Asia, a Chinese gathering of
bigwigs. Mr Xi’s initiative is dense, browfurrowing stuff. He calls
for a security order that is “common, comprehensive, cooperative
and sustainable” and declares humanity “an indivisible security
community”. This slab of partyspeak is sprinkled with bromides
about respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity that sound
rich coming from a friend of Mr Putin’s.
Mr Xi’s speech is a code. Governments from Europe to Japan
and Australia should take it seriously, for it is China’s latest bid to
delegitimise the Americanled defence alliances and treaties that
have guaranteed their security for decades. Much of Mr Xi’s new
initiative builds on “Asia for the Asians” arguments that China has
promoted in its home region for years. In a commentary on his
boss’s Global Security Initiative, China’s foreign minister, Wang
Yi, traced the lineage of common, comprehensive, cooperative
and sustainable security back to a “New Asian Security Concept”
offered by Mr Xi in 2014 to the Conference on Interaction and Con
fidenceBuilding Measures in Asia (cica), a multinational forum.
Eight years ago Mr Xi called for Asian countries to shun defence
alliances that include some countries but exclude others (the
meaning of calls for common and cooperative security) and to
handle disputes by dialogue (ie, prodding them to bargain oneon
one with China, their giant neighbour). Mr Xi’s cicaspeech in
cluded the declaration: “It is for the people of Asia to run the af
fairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of
Asia”—an unusually bald hint for America to leave the region.
In contrast, Mr Xi’s talk of indivisible security is a more recent
addition to China’s lexicon, and echoes Russian talking points
about Europe. Europeans have debated indivisible security, the
idea that countries should not ignore other nations’ legitimate se
curity interests, ever since coldwar efforts to set ground rules for
Soviet coexistence with the West. Russia’s definition of indivis
ible security is selfserving: a demand for a say over any European
defence arrangements that offset Russia’s offensive capabilities. A
Western diplomat summarises the argument as: “You can never be
secure, as long as we do not feel secure.”Building a world with impunity for great powers
Since the Ukraine crisis began Chinese diplomats have called for a
“balanced, effective and sustainable European security architec
ture”. The same phrase then turned up in Mr Xi’s Global Security
Initiative, shorn of European references. China has been studying
Europe, says Wang Yiwei of Renmin University, and thinks that se
curity deals there must involve Russia, as one of five permanent
members of the unSecurity Council, or the un will lose its mean
ing. Indeed, for global agreements outside Europe to endure, Chi
na thinks that all five of those powers should be consulted, along
side such bodies as the African Union, Professor Wang suggests.
There is an obvious objection to a world order that grants veto
rights to America, Britain, China, France and Russia, the five per
manent Security Council members. Because the five agree about
little, an international community that needs unpermission to
act will often struggle to intervene. That would not break China’s
heart, or Russia’s: both loathe Western powers acting as global po
licemen. China suspects that many developing countries agree,
and will applaud its Global Security Initiative. America and itsal
lies call their united actions over Ukraine proof that the Westis
not finished just yet. China sees a chance to prove them wrong.nChaguan
Xi Jinping lays out a worldview with Chinese-Russian roots