The Economist May 7th 2022 Finance&economics 67
rally” of 2014; stress in the repo market (a
key money market where Treasuries can be
swapped for cash) in September 2019; and
the covid19 shock of March 2020, in which
the Treasury market in effectceased to
function for periods of time—have created
serious doubts about how robust the Trea
sury market is.
Each of the episodes had slightly differ
ent causes. Regardless of the robustness of
the Treasury market, there was little that
would have stopped the extreme nature of
the covid19 shock from rocking it. The re
po crisis was in part the result of some per
verse incentives caused by postcrisis reg
ulation that deterred banks from holding
Treasuries. But both were exacerbated by a
deeper issue, says Randal Quarles, a former
vicechair for supervision at the Fed,
which is that the Treasury market “has
grown out of its waist size”.
A combination of financialcrisis stim
ulus, fiscal deficits under President Trump
and pandemicera splurge have caused the
Treasury market to grow nearly fivefold
since 2007. At the same time fresh regula
tion imposed on investment banks, which
are the main conduits in Treasury markets,
such as the introduction of the supple
mentalleverage ratio, which measures the
total size of bank assets relative to the
amount of capital they hold, has restricted
their ability to facilitate Treasurymarket
activity. The rule is not very friendly to
lowrisk activities, such as holding Trea
suries. A report released last year by the
Group of Thirty, an economics advisory bo
dy, warned that “the aggregate amount of
capital allocated to marketmaking by
bankaffiliated dealers has not kept pace”
with its lightning growth.
To combat issues that have cropped up
in the past the Fed has taken measures to
increase liquidity, such as opening up a
“standing facility” for selected intermedi
aries to swap Treasuries for cash. But few
think that this is a panacea for dysfunc
tion. Mr Duffie favours replacing the cur
rent market structure, which relies on bro
kerdealers, with a centralclearing sys
tem. This would make it easier for market
participants to interact directly—for one
mutual fund, say, to sell to another without
relying on a bank to intermediate the tran
saction. But the fix would be no match for
“the scale of the problem”, says Mr Quarles.
A more urgent task, he argues, is to loosen
the regulatory shackles hampering invest
ment banks from supporting the market.
That is unlikely to happen soon: there is
little appetite in Washington for weaken
ing bank regulation.
In the absence of an obvious fix, the un
knowable fallout from the Fed’s pullout is
adding to the uncertainty created by rising
rates, stagflation and geopolitical ructions.
Liquidity in the Treasury market is already
thinning: the “yield error” captured by the
BloombergTreasuryliquidityindex,which
measuresthedifferencebetweentheyield
a Treasuryistradedatanda measureoffair
value,is12%higherthanitwasinJanuary.
It has more than doubled since August
2021. Thegrowingpossibilityofrenewed
dysfunction could deter investors from
dealingfurther,makingityetlikelierthat
themarketseizesup.Theonceplacidlife
ofTreasurybillsandbondscouldgetmore
chaoticfora while.n
T-bills, bills, bills
United States, Treasury-security holdings, $trn
*Excludingintragovernmental debt
25
20
15
10
5
0
191715132011 22
Total outstanding*
Held by the
Federal Reserve
Source: St Louis Federal Reserve
Chinesestocks
Flee market
O
n may 3rdinvestors in Chinese stocks
woke up to the news that Jack Ma, the
cofounder of ecommerce giant Alibaba,
had been arrested on nationalsecurity
charges. Or so many of them thought. State
media were reporting that a tech worker
with the surname Ma had been detained in
the city of Hangzhou. The description
seemed to fit that of the billionaire tech
magnate, whose companies are based in
Hangzhou and have been subject to a regu
latory onslaught over the past year. The
speculation, it rapidly turned out, was
wrong (Ma is a common family name in
China). But not before Alibaba shares
dipped 9%, temporarily wiping out more
than $25bn in the firm’s market value.
The incident shows how fragile market
sentiment has become in China. Beijing’s
unpredictable, oftenshocking policy
swerves in recent years have made it all the
more conceivable that the country’s most
prominent entrepreneur could suddenly
be accused of attempting to “split the
country and subvert the state”. President Xi
Jinping’s increasingly ideological cam
paign to rid China of the Omicron variant
ofcovid19isthreateningtothrottleeco
nomicgrowththisyear.Hisunwavering
supportforRussia,evenasVladimirPutin
commitswarcrimesinUkraine,hasfur
therfuelledtheperceptionthatthecoun
try’sleaders,onceknownfortheirpragma
tism,arefaltering.
Theshifthasbeenpunctuatedbygloo
my comments from prominent experts
whountilveryrecentlyremainedupbeat
onChina.StephenRoach,theformerAsia
chairmanofMorganStanley,a bank,has
longdefendedChinesepolicy.Butina re
centarticleinProjectSyndicate, anonline
publication,hesaid“theChinacushion”,
theeconomicmightthathelpedpowerthe
worldthroughtheglobalfinancialcrisisin
2008, had “deflated”. Shan Weijian, the
chiefexecutiveofpag, a HongKongbased
privateequityfirm,recentlytoldinvestors
theChineseeconomy“atthismomentisin
theworstshapeinthepast 30 years”,theFi-
nancialTimesreported.
Some useharsher language—andare
gettingpunishedforit.JoergWuttke,the
head oftheEuropeanchamber ofcom
merceinChina,lastweeksuggestedinan
interviewwitha SwisswebsitethatChina’s
zerocovidstrategyhasputmanydecision
makersin“selfdestructionmode”.Hong
Hao,anoutspokenanalystatBankofCom
munications,a statelender,recentlyhada
Chinesesocialmediaaccountfrozenafter
hepublished anegativeoutlook onthe
economy.Hehasnowleftthebank.
Muchofthedarkeningsentimenthas
been focusedon MrXi’s covid strategy.
ClosingdownShanghai,China’sbusiness
andfinancialhub,seemedunimaginable
onlya fewmonthsago.Butthecityof25m
has undergone a strict lockdown since
April1st.FlareupsofcovidinBeijingand
othercitieshavepromptedtargetedlock
downs.Aregimeoftestingforthevirusis
quicklybecomingpartofeverydaylife.
Thecostsofcontrollingthespreadof
Omicronarebecomingapparent.Factory
activityhassuffereddearlyandstrainson
shippingandlogisticsareripplingthrough
globalsupplychains.Thecentralgovern
S HANGHAI
China’s erratic policies are
terrifying investors
Dimming sums
Net non-resident portfolio equity
flows into China*, $bn
Source: Institute of
International Finance *Four-week moving average
4
2
0
-2
-4
222120191817162015