24 FLYPAST November 2018
Below
A Defi ant II with
aircrew, and the CO
Wg Cdr J F Inkster, in
the centre, circa July- A THOMAS VIA
A PRICE
1918 2018activity, but the enemy
was certainly out there. Fg Off
George Walters took off from
Tangmere five minutes after
Andersen and headed over the
English Channel to take up his
station. Walters, an Australian, was
not with his regular air gunner as he
had a cold, and so had taken W/O
George Neil in his place. Both
pilot and replacement gunner failed
to return.
The demise of Walters and Neil had
been witnessed not just by their
predator, but also by a Mosquito
Mk.XII of 256 Squadron on a
defensive patrol out of Ford, Sussex.
The pilot spotted what he thought
was a ‘friendly’ going down in flames
about ten miles ahead of him. He
raced to the scene, spotted a Focke-
Wulf Fw 190 close by and engaged,
shooting down the fighter with a
single burst. It was assumed his
victim was in turn the victor over
the Defiant.ON THEIR OWN
Reg Dunbar was an NCO air
gunner with 515 Squadron, who
flew both Moonshine and Mandrel
operations. He arrived at the unit
having miraculously survived two
tours as a rear gunner – some 50 ‘ops’- at a time when many didn’t make
it through their first half-dozen.
He and the other air gunners were
sent initially to Drem, Scotland, to
train. They were also despatched to
Malvern to be instructed by TRE
scientists on the ‘special’ equipment
to be installed in their Defiants.
Dunbar reported: “For our daylight
operations [Moonshine] we would fly
until the Germans ‘saw’ us, then the
pilot would turn the aircraft around,
put the nose down and return to base
at sea level.”
At night, the dangers were greater
still: “When we reached our patrol
area, we would switch on the
equipment to jam the German radar,
just at the time the main force of
bombers went out or was due back.”
Communication with their
controller was lost while Mandrel was
switched on: “There was a danger of
interference, but the danger to us was
that our controller could not warn us
if there were enemy aircraft in the
area. We were on our own. It was not
unusual to get back and find one of
our number missing.
“We had a dual role as gunner and
equipment operator. When it was
time to operate the jammer, I would
have to drop the bench-like seat we
sat on and squeeze down inside the
fuselage to switch the equipment on.
While all this was [happening],
remember, we were effectively totally
defenceless. I was not at my guns and
no-one could warn us if there were
any enemy fighters about.”
The air gunners were not only
absent from their turrets to flick a
switch. Their role was to find the
relevant Freya frequency and ensurethe needle on the ‘dial’ was constantly
in place to ensure a continuous ‘jam’
was maintained. “This meant being
absent from our guns for 20 and
sometimes 30 minutes while on
station, meaning that at any
moment we could be ‘jumped’ by an
enemy fighter, with no means of
fighting back.”
Dunbar believes most losses to
enemy fighters occurred while the air
gunner was busily engaged with the
Mandrel equipment. Certainly, those
who were shot down appeared to
have been taken by surprise.
There is a tendency in previously
published material to confuse
Moonshine and Mandrel, even
though both performed disparate
tasks and presented different risks.
But were they effective?
Contemporary records suggest they
made a significant and unheralded
contribution to the air war –
Moonshine diverting large numbers
of German fighters away from the
genuine attacking force and Mandrel
creating the screen to allow hundreds
of bombers to pass unseen.
A lengthy report dated June 1943
states there was “real evidence” to
show both ground and Defiant-based
Mandrel had a tangible impact on
reducing Bomber Command’s losses.
The minute also detailed reports
from the local resistance fighters,
which showed ground-based, but
more especially Defiant Mandrel,
were “a considerable nuisance to
coastal Freya stations”.