Cosmopolitanism and Material Ethics 99inhibits the protagonist’s prospects for cosmopolitan agency and
redemption.
For the Magistrate, putting into practice his conciliatory cosmo-
politan ideals is therefore a corporeal as much as an intellectual task,
requiring his physical removal from a position of authority within
the Empire’s disciplinary power apparatus. Achieving (or perhaps
being subjected to) this in turn necessitates the realization of his
complicity with the Empire’s repressive regime. Comparing him-
self to Joll toward the close of the novel, the Magistrate somberly
reflects: “I was not, as I liked to think, the indulgent pleasure-loving
opposite of the cold rigid Colonel. I was the lie that Empire tells
itself when times are easy, he the truth that Empire tells when harsh
winds blow. Two sides of imperial rule, no more, no less (p. 148).”
This realization is then followed by a visible effort to put into prac-
tice the cosmopolitan principles we witness him exhibit earlier in
the narrative. Leaving the protective gates of the fort, the Magistrate
tentatively approaches the newly built “fisherfolk” settlement and
finds an empty hut in which to sleep for the night. When a band of
the town’s soldiers come to break up the settlement, he aggressively
intercedes, putting himself at great physical risk in an attempt to
disrupt the disciplinary authority he had once represented (p. 151).
Whereas Coetzee is careful to avoid presenting a polished didactic or
ethical message in Waiting for the Barbarians , the circumstances that
surround the Magistrate’s inner transition nonetheless offer invalu-
able insights into the relationship between power and ethics. Perhaps
the most urgent of these is that conciliatory cosmopolitan principles
are impeded in hierarchical and disciplinary societies, particularly
when pursued by those favorably situated in such societies.
Disgrace features a protagonist undergoing an ontological change
of comparable magnitude to that seen in the Magistrate. However,
Lurie’s transformation is different in a number of ways. For the
Magistrate, the change is brought about by a physical encounter
with society’s disciplinary procedures, which repositions his rela-
tionship within the social order. Lurie’s transition happens under
very different circumstances and relies less on his own movement
in social status than on a profound reassessment of the ethics that
govern interactions between human (and nonhuman) beings. The