168 Sigrid Faath and hanSpeter Mat teS
onward, the Lebanon War of 2006, the confrontation with Hamas in Gaza,
especially since the victory of Hamas in the 2006 elections, culminating in
the Gaza War 2008/2009, and the negative repercussions of the Arab Spring
on Arab-Israeli relations since 2011.
Despite the many analyses, we still, today, do not have a satisfactory
answer to why this conf lict has been so resistant to a (negotiated) settlement
or why there is what some call a ‘structural peacelessness’ (Hubel 1999) in
Palestine – or in the whole of the Middle East for that matter (Bickerton
2011; Scott-Baumann 2009).^11 The ref lections in Hubel’s study of 1999 are
still valid today and point out the main factors hindering a peace solution:
First of all, a structural analysis of the regional politics of the Middle
East could at least determine why peacelessness has been so dominant;
then a look at the reigning political norms in the region, inf luenced
as they are by the respective cultures, could contribute to solving this
puzzle; f inally, an examination of the various different forms of politi-
cal governance can also help us to reach our goal (Hubel 1999: 552).Since the end of 2007, the solution to the conf lict seems to have receded even
further – despite repeated calls for a new Middle East Peace Conference (Roy
2007). On the one hand, the parties in question and their respective interests
seem generally too different (Schuster 2007) and not directed enough toward
the long-term goal of an overall peace agreement. The situation worsened
in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the new Islamist wave, especially
in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood and the inf luential Salaf ist movement,
with their new political parties (Freedom and Justice Party; Nour Party),
harbour strong anti-Israeli feelings. The lack of acceptance of the state of
Israel among the population and important Islamist leaders makes peace
negotiations tenuous. And there is the continuous precarious social and
economic situation in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank, caused by Israel’s
isolationist policies (e.g., the refusal to grant the Palestinians a harbour), the
tax blockade, the loss of international funds following the victory of Hamas
in the elections of January 2006 (Levitt 2006), and the Gaza War between
Israeli forces and Hamas in the winter of 2008/2009 (Cordesman 2009).
The three Gulf wars to date had very different causes though, in principle,
it was always about who would politically gain the upper hand over the Gulf
11 This reality is contradicted only by the great conf idence of such politicians as, for example,
Avi Primor, Israel’s ex-ambassador to Germany.