The uncerTainTies involved in calculaTing migraTion 193
lead to major disturbances to Egypt’s and Tunisia’s tourist business, to
detrimental effects on their foreign currency balances and, in the end, to
negative repercussions in their job markets. This was the case following
the recent revolutionary upheavals. Such uncertainties make it diff icult to
make prognoses about domestic conf licts that can eventually cause smaller
or larger migratory movements to regions both near and far.
6.1.1 The example of Turkey
Various future scenarios of the development of world politics and world
economics (e.g., by Pricewaterhouse Coopers) refer to Turkey – which
represents a sort of bridge between the Oriental and Occidental parts of
the world – as one country that will belong to the winners in the world
economy over the coming decades and will play an important role in both
regional and supraregional affairs. These scenarios, which foresee lower
migration from Turkey and stimulate return, assume the integration of
Turkey in the EU, as well as a stable domestic situation as a result of EU
regulatory policies. Yet these policies conf lict with many of the doctrines
found in Turkey’s political and cultural history (see Bezwan 2008).
Turkey’s full membership of the EU is currently being blocked by forces
within the EU that raise both cultural and migration-policy objections.
The stabilisation of the domestic situation is hampered not only by ongoing
conf lict with the Kurds, but also by the struggle between the secular groups
(Kemalists) supported by the powerful military and the traditionalist
Islamic groups that can win elections. This cultural and political struggle
has yet to be decided def initively. Such political uncertainties could disrupt
the migration potential proposed by Heinz Fassmann and the migration
scenarios proposed by Bommes, Fellmer and Zigman in this volume, which
are based on the example of Poland and derive from both demographic and
socio-economic developments.
6.1.2 The example of the Mediterranean Union
These uncertainties also affect another project initiated by the EU – the
Mediterranean Union – whose institutional organisation, f inancial endow-
ment and effectivity have become even more unpredictable due to the
recent upheavals in the Arab world. The planned trade preferences and
public and private investments, which were supposed to revitalise the
faltering Barcelona Process, would surely have been able to further both
economic and social development in the region and reduce existing migra-