euro-Mediterranean Migration futures 69
economy continues to grow, the unique ‘window of opportunity’ offered to
the next generations entering the labour market, bearing an exceptionally
light demographic burden, may well result in a rapidly decreasing emigration
potential, as Morocco seems quite close to the origin-destination income-gap
threshold levels at which emigration seems to decline. This is likely to coincide
with increasing immigration and settlement from sub-Saharan Africa, a pro-
cess which has already been set in motion (de Haas 2007a). However, if recent
reforms are not sustained and economic growth remains sluggish, Morocco’s
migration hump may be extended or transformed into a semi-permanent ‘mi-
gration plateau’ of sustained out-migration. Although this primarily depends
on domestic political factors, the implementation and effects of Morocco’s
association agreement with the EU will play a fundamental role, too.
Assuming a steadily declining emigration potential of Eastern European
countries, Turkey and perhaps even the Maghreb countries (such as Tunisia),
in the more-medium term, the challenging question then becomes where
future immigrant workers will come from.
Perhaps this will bring Egypt onto the agenda, as it is a comparatively
poor middle-income country with relatively few economic prospects and
little political freedom bordering the ‘migration frontier’ of the expanding
European migration system. Perhaps the current increases in the regular
and irregular migration of Egyptian labourers to Italy (often via Libya),
and even Greece, will create new bridgeheads in the form of new migrant
communities which may facilitate more migration. While income gaps with
the EU seem ideal for generating ‘take-off ’ migration, Europe seems to be an
increasingly attractive destination compared to the low salaries and poor
working conditions which Arab countries can offer, in particular to the
lower-skilled. This may lead Egyptian workers to increasingly shun the Arab
countries in the same way that Maghrebi and Turkish workers have done.
So far, the Arab Spring has not radically transformed long-term migration
patterns in the Mediterranean. It also seems naïve to think that successful
political and economic reform will lead to rapidly decreasing emigration.
The same processes that created the conditions for revolutionary change
are also conducive to emigration. The coming-of-age of a new, educated
and aspiring generation, frustrated by mass unemployment, dictatorial rule
and corruption, has increased both the emigration and the revolutionary
potential of Arab societies. So the idea that emigration will stop is as un-
likely as the idea of a ‘mass exodus’ towards Europe (de Haas & Sigona 2012).
Nevertheless, as recent migration trends in Turkey and the migration
transitions of Southern European countries have clearly shown, we cannot
simply take for granted that current migration trends will persist. In addi-