70 Hein de Haas
tion, the data presented above undermine any assumption that the EU is
surrounded by countries where there is an almost inf inite source of cheap
labour ready to migrate as soon as the opportunity presents itself. This
assumption – which underlies popular perceptions of mounting ‘migra-
tion pressure’ (often ignoring labour demand in Europe and disregarding
rapidly decreasing fertility levels in origin countries) and which fuels fears
of migrants swamping the European continent – is fundamentally f lawed.
First, this assumption is based on the erroneous belief that absolute
poverty is the root cause of migration, ignoring the fact that the relation
between development and migration is fundamentally non-linear. The
above analysis has largely conf irmed the transitional-migration theory
proposed in the second section of this chapter. The most important emi-
gration countries are middle-income ones located at the periphery of the
expanding core of the European migration system.
Second, this assumption overlooks the signif icant social, demographic,
economic and political transformations that countries bordering the EU
to the south have experienced. These transformations, embodied in the
term development, are likely to affect future emigration and immigration
potential in somewhat unexpected ways.
Much depends on future economic growth in Europe, which has been the
main driver of rising labour demand attracting immigrants. The economic
crisis in Europe has signif icantly reduced inf lows. Since 2010, many South-
ern European countries have become emigration countries. However if, in
the longer term, the core of the European migration system – consisting
of net immigration countries – keeps on expanding, future migrants may
increasingly come from more distant countries located in, for instance, West
and Central Africa. Although it is notoriously diff icult to make long-term
predictions, in the more distant future the global demand for skilled and
unskilled labour may increase due to the now global and universal decline
in fertility. As more and more countries are turning into net receivers of
migrants, this raises the question of where all these migrants will come
from; even if there are workers interested in migrating with the eagerness
people assume, it is unclear whether they want to migrate to Europe right
now. The future question for European policymakers might no longer be
‘How to keep them out?’ but ‘How to attract them?’. This turnaround in
policy views is already happening for high-skilled migrants, as testif ied by
the growing European appetite for Green Card-like point systems to attract
high-skilled migrants, and the boom in student immigration. Pressing and
growing labour-demand-specif ic sectors of EU labour markets may perhaps
also lead to a similar turnaround concerning low-skilled migrants.