72 Boundaries and Beyond
Wuyu in the east of Tong’an. Jinjiang, Nan’an and Tong’an districts were
also dotted with fortresses and beacon installations.^55
In the mid-sixteenth century, Zheng Ruozeng, who served as Hu
Zongxian’s advisor during the anti-Wo campaigns in the 1550s, showed
a revived interest in seaborne transport, seeing it as a means to enhance
naval strength. Zheng was a keen maritime observer and produced
perhaps the most original and best drawn maps of coastal defenses
during Ming times. He strongly recommended the use of sea-going
vessels as a means of transporting goods. The idea, a s he pointed out, was
not new. It had been adopted under the Qin, and the Yuan governments
also began to encourage sea transport in 1282. However, the practice was
stopped in 1412, somewhat ironically during the Yongle Reign that saw
the unprecedented sea expeditions under the command of Zheng He. In
an essay on sea transport, Zheng Ruozeng explained that, “[such a plan]
will prepare the country for naval battles”.^56
Since Zheng Ruozeng was very much involved in the suppression of
piracy, his failure to mention Japan as a primary threat at the time is
puzzling. An anti-Wo general, Wang Yu, describes the maritime condition
in a memorial as follows:
I heard that the Wo bandits in the southeast are like the Xiongnu
in the northwest. They are crafty and valiant. They are so powerful
it is difβicult to resist them. They come swiftly on favorable winds
and are unpredictable. Therefore, our defenses against the Wo
run from Shandong in the north to Fujian and Guangdong in the
south. The strategic planning is no less than that in the northwest.
Moreover, contacting the barbarian lands and putting to sea had
been strictly prohibited; the restriction to ten-year intervals for
the arrival of the tribute missions has also been implemented.
[Both are for the purpose of enhancing the defense.]^57Not all scholars were impressed by the Ming efforts. An early Qing
author attributed the Ming’s weaknesses in coastal defense to its failure
to maintain a regular water-borne or naval force. A battle-ready navy
came into existence only to deal with exigencies. At other times, patrol
- TXJGLBS, 26: 78b–79b.
- ZKYZZ, 2: 71a.
- In Wang Yu 王忬, “Wo yi rongliu panni jiujie rukou shu” 倭夷容留叛逆糾結入寇
疏 [A memorial about the joint invasion of the Japanese and Chinese rebels], in
TWWXCK, no. 289, p. 67; see also Ming jingshi wenbian 明經世文編 [Collected
essays on statecraft from the Ming Dynasty] (hereafter MJSWB), comp. Chen
Zilong, Xu Fuyuan, et al. 陳子龍 (1608–47)、徐孚远 (1599–1665) 等選輯
(comp. 1638) (reprint; Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962), 283: 30a–32a.
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