42 China The Economist May 14th 2022
A selfrepressingsociety
F
or fourdecades China has defied received wisdom about the
institutions that countries must build to become rich and
strong. After the Communist Party’s bosses embraced market forc
es in 1979, many foreign observers predicted that political reforms
had to follow, such as the emergence of more independent courts
to sustain the rule of law and uphold property rights. In time, the
optimistic foreigners ventured, most advanced economies realise
that they need democratic—or at least accountable—political sys
tems. Societies with such “inclusive institutions” enjoy both sta
bility and broadbased prosperity, Chinese officials were told.
China’s leaders heeded something less than half this advice.
Over 40 years successive leaders have tolerated only as much eco
nomic and social openness as is compatible with unchallenged
party authority. President Xi Jinping, the party chief since 2012,
has broken even more decisively with norms that hold sway in
much of the rich world. He has explicitly condemned the separa
tion of powers and an independent judiciary as unwelcome West
ern notions. His China is proud to offer not the rule of law but
“lawbased governance” via partycontrolled courts.
There have been changes at the grassroots, too. In Mr Xi’s Chi
na, ever more power, including coercive power, is wielded by party
members and volunteers with fuzzy legal mandates. During the
covid19 pandemic many residents of lockeddown cities have
been forced into squalid quarantine sites or sealed inside housing
compounds by pandemic workers, swaddled in the anonymous
fullbody suits that explain their nickname, “Big Whites”. A few
are police officers or local officials. But others are zealous volun
teers, imposing house arrest without a warrant. Even before covid
emerged, Chinese leaders had called for citizens to take more dis
putes to mediation by unpaid local worthies, rather than to law
courts. In recent years private companies, including joint ven
tures with foreign firms, have been pressed to form or revive party
cells made up of employees with party membership, enjoying ill
defined authority.
Scholars of authoritarian politics have taken note of this trend.
Two recent books take complementary looks at how the party em
braces ambiguity as it controls the masses—or rather, encourages
citizens to control one another. By way of case study, both books
examine the same area of public policy, namely urbanisation
schemes that have displaced many tens of millions of Chinese. Of
ten the land that they farmed was requisitioned and sold to devel
opers or their homes were demolished, by force and with paltry or
no compensation. At the root of such schemes is an institutional
void: in China property rights are anything but secure. As Daniel
Mattingly of Yale University estimates in “The Art of Political Con
trol in China”, published in 2019, land requisitions have in effect
redistributed property worth trillions of dollars from rural collec
tives to the state. Yet as Lynette Ong of the University of Toronto
describes in her new book, “Outsourcing Repression, Everyday
State Power in Contemporary China”, resistance to violent land
grabs in China has been fragmented and easily squelched.
One reason, both books suggest, is a tradition of delegating dir
ty work to nonofficial agents. These include hired thugs lacking
uniforms or badges, sent to wreck homes, cut power and water
supplies, or beat up those who try to petition higher authorities.
Their links to local officialdom are unprovable but blatant. One
gambit involves thugs bulldozing communal lavatories, allowing
bureaucrats to declare a village unsanitary and so fit only for de
molition, records Ms Ong. Even a threadbare cover for official bru
tality is useful, though. Drawing on a data set of over 2,000 cases
of forced landtaking or demolition recorded by news outlets and
rights groups, as well as on hundreds of her own field interviews
conducted from 2011 to 2019, Ms Ong finds that citizens were more
likely to resist when police acted brutally or officials led thugs into
battle in person. Citizens were more fatalistic when attacked by
anonymous toughs. The public expects nothing better from them,
but is indignant when the state breaks laws, she suggests.
The tyranny of the majority, plus bulldozers
Recorded incidents of violence declined but did not end after 2013,
as national leaders urged campaigns of “harmonious demolition”,
moved in part by nationwide outrage over citizens killed or driven
to suicide during violent landgrabs. In the Xi era anticorruption
campaigns have ensnared some local tyrants who razed scores of
villages for profit. Harmonious demolitions may be achieved by
recruiting village elders or volunteers with deep community ties
to press their own neighbours to sign demolition papers. Some in
volve the settingup of zigaiwei, or “Autonomous Redevelopment
Committees”. Guided by unseen officials, these are not as benign
as they sound. Ms Ong describes local powerbrokers spying on
households that refuse to comply, setting family members against
each other, or hunting for individuals vulnerable to pressure, such
as public employees who can be threatened with the sack. Hold
outs are publicly shamed for resisting the majority’s will. Talk of
the majority reveals the Maoist roots of outsourced repression. Mr
Xi’s China is reviving the “mass line”: a strategy of using rewards
and punishments, but also ideological “thought work”, to mobil
ise the many and ostracise the dissenting few.
Conventional wisdom holds that a strong civil society gives
citizens leverage over governments. In fact, coopted clan leaders
and village elders can serve autocrats well, writes Mr Mattingly.
Indeed, official biographies of Mr Xi record how, as a young village
party secretary in rural Shaanxi, he recruited a local clan leader to
help him confiscate land for a dam, including a clan cemetery.
Party bosses grow impatient when foreigners question China’s
autocratic politics, pointing to years of growth. But economiescan
also slow. When they do, inclusive institutions offer legitimacy
that armtwisting and opaque powerstructures cannot match.n
Chaguan
Xi Jinping sees strengths in Maoist tools of social control