The Economist May 14th 2022 53
BritainAn interviewwithBorisJohnsonA hawk on the wing
“T
he invasionof Ukraine by Vladimir
Putin was a massive punctuation
point in postwar history,” says Boris John
son, the British prime minister. “We are
now in a new era.” One sign of this new age
came on May 11th, when Mr Johnson trav
elled first to Sweden and then to Finland to
sign “solemn declarations” with the lead
ers of both countries; in each case the sig
natories affirmed that should either one be
attacked, the other would be ready to re
spond with military aid. Another sign
came the next day, when Finland’s leaders
announced they favoured joining nato.
The events of this week underscore the
dramatic changes in Europe’s security
landscape since Mr Putin’s decision to in
vade on February 24th. They also shed light
on Britain’s place in Europe and illustrate
Mr Johnson’s frustrating duality—bold
abroad and timid at home.
Start with the pacts. Finland was neu
tral in the cold war, and Sweden hasn’t
fought a big conventional war in 200 years.With both countries now moving swiftly
towards nato membership, the agree
ments with Britain offer particular reassur
ance against Russian attack during the
“greyzone period” between applying to
join and ratification of their membership.
If they do join the alliance, “it would be a
complete repudiation of Putin’s assump
tions,” says Mr Johnson, speaking to The
Economiston the plane back to London.
Sceptics might say that making com
mitments is easy when the risk of a con
ventional assault is low, at least in the im
mediate future. Russia’s army is bogged
down in Ukraine and barely has the man
power to advance in the Donbas region, let
alone turn its attention to Finland and
Sweden. “Looking at Russian military forc
es right now, they are rather occupied in
Ukraine,” noted Magdalena Andersson, the
Swedish prime minister.
Finnish and Swedish officials think
that a far bigger risk is a prolonged and in
tense campaign of “hybrid” warfare—meaning cyberattacks on critical infra
structure, incursions by Russian war
planes, disinformation campaigns and the
like. The agreements cover closer cooper
ation in areas such as intelligencesharing
and cybersecurity, and are meant to stand
in perpetuity. “Are we safer with this agree
ment? Yes, we are. Of course this means
something,” Ms Andersson concluded.
The deals fit with Britain’s evolution ov
er the past decade into one of the most ac
tive defenders of nato’s northern flank
and eastern front. It is central to a network
of bilateral pacts and groupings, including
the Joint Expeditionary Force, a cluster of
ten states around the Baltic and the North
Sea. Britain shunned a treaty on foreign
policy and security when it left the eu. As a
result, says Richard Whitman of the Uni
versity of Kent, its policy in Europe resem
bles a “Polo mint”: it has a hard outer rim,
and a hole in the middle.
Hardedged is a good way of describing
Mr Johnson’s view of the war in Ukraine.
Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s foreign minis
ter, has raised the country’s goals to noth
ing less than the liberation of the territo
ries invaded by Russia in 2014. Ukraine’s
war aims are a matter for them, but that as
piration is “entirely logical”, Mr Johnson
says. Ukrainians feel they cannot “negoti
ate sensibly with someone who is in the
process of trying to devour their country.
And I have to say I agree with them. SoOVER THE NORTH SEA
Security deals with Finland and Sweden showcase the prime minister’s thinking
on the war in Ukraine→Alsointhissection
54 Sir BeerStarmer
55 Bagehot:LabourandtheLibDems
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