The Economist May 14th 2022 57
InternationalInternationalrelationsConnective action
A
command centre to scan the digital
realm for global disinformation cam
paigns. Standardised plugs for electric cars
that will work both in America and in the
European Union (eu) and so lower the cost
of building the infrastructure needed to
decarbonise. A transatlantic team to scout
for attempts by China and others to manip
ulate global technical standards in their fa
vour. These sorts of initiatives sound like
common sense, but they are difficult in a
world where even allies have competing
regulators, vying for technological domi
nion. Happily, a transatlantic diplomatic
undertaking that most people have never
heard of is trying to change all that.
The group in question, called the “Trade
and Technology Council” (ttc), will con
vene in Saclay, a suburb of Paris, on May
15th and 16th. A constellation of grand offi
cials from either side of the Atlantic—in
cluding America’s secretary of state, com
merce secretary and top trade negotiator,
and the eu’s commissioners for trade and
competition—will be meeting for the sec
ond time. Whereas their first meeting in
September in Pittsburgh was mainly
meant for participants to get to know each
other, the gathering in France will assess
progress on their work so far and set goals
for the next two years.
It is a momentous task. The ttcis the
West’s response to efforts by China and
others (notably Russia after its invasion of
Ukraine) to build an autocratic digital
world and bring the physical supply
chains that underpin it under their con
trol. “The big question is whether demo
cratic governments can develop a mean
ingful alternative,” explains Marietje
Schaake of the Cyber Policy Centre at Stan
ford University. If America and the eure
solve their differences in tech, other coun
tries are bound to follow their lead: the pair
account for 55% of the global market for in
formation technology, whose value is ex
pected to reach a staggering $4.4trn this
year, according to Gartner, a consultancy.
The ttcwas set up last year as a “trans
atlantic interagency”, in the words of Paul
Triolo of the Albright Stonebridge Group, a
foreignpolicy consultancy. It is supposedto be the main venue in which America and
the eu coordinate policy for the digital
realm. The two sides have created ten
working groups, ranging from “technology
standards” and “secure supply chains” to
“investment screening” and “climate and
clean tech”.
The structure of the ttcallows the rele
vant agencies and experts in Brussels and
Washington to develop working relation
ships that go beyond ad hoc encounters
that have long dominated transatlantic
policymaking. It is a practical forum in
which they can resolve their digital differ
ences. Officials once barely knew who was
in charge of a given topic on the other side
of the Atlantic. Now they can just jump on
a video call. “The ttchas become the con
duit for much of the useu cooperation,”
explains the chair of one of the council’s
working groups.
The ttchas already helped move nego
tiations along in several areas, particularly
with regard to a new version of “Privacy
Shield”, an agreement to create a clear legal
basis for flows of personal data across the
Atlantic. The original was struck down by
the European Court of Justice in 2020. It
ruled that the agreement did not suffi
ciently limit American lawenforcement
agencies’ access to the personal data of
European citizens.
Although talks to reform “Privacy
Shield” are not officially on thettc’s agen
da, they involve many of the same officials.
Their familiarity with each other was oneB ERLIN AND SAN FRANCISCO
The war in Ukraine has not just rejuvenated transatlantic co-operation
in defence, but in tech too