58 International TheEconomistMay14th 2022
big reason why President Joe Biden and Ur
sula von der Leyen, the president of the
European Commission, were able to an
nounce in March that both sides had final
ly agreed on a deal “in principle”. This will
provide the basis for more progress in the
ttc. If America and the euhad not even
been able to agree on data flows, says an
other official, other attempts at transatlan
tic cooperation in tech policy would have
been futile.
Another project that has benefited from
the ttcis the “Declaration for the Future of
the Internet”, which was announced on
April 28th and signed by more than 60
countries. Complementing the ttc, this
document lays out the priorities for an
“open, free, global, interoperable, reliable,
and secure” internet—describing in effect
an alternative to China’s and Russia’s
increasingly autocratic technosphere. Yet
it is not aimed mainly at those two powers,
both of which are certain to ignore it. It
serves instead as a warning to other coun
tries tempted to copy some of the pair’s au
thoritarian ways.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has both
spurred the council’s efforts and proved
their usefulness. Officials had, among oth
er things, to decide which technology ex
ports to block, how to strengthen cyberse
curity defences and what to do about Rus
sia’s online disinformation campaigns.
“That has given us something to cooper
ate on,” says another ttc participant.
Unsurprisingly, in light of the war, the
beefiest proposals in a leaked draft of the
“joint statement” to be published at the
end of the meeting in Saclay relate to secu
rity. Both sides wish to share more infor
mation and harmonise regulations, a step
which could one day lead to a common list
of sensitive technologies to be kept out of
the hands of autocratic regimes. As for
supply chains, the idea is to develop,
among other things, an earlywarning sys
tem to avoid the sort of bottlenecks that
have led to the current shortage of micro
chips. The two sides will also vow to re
frain from further “subsidy races”, a clear
danger in the semiconductor industry.
But in most areas, the council’s woolly
pledges hint at the difficulty of the task
ahead. In ai,the euand America aim to
“develop a shared hub/repository of met
rics and methodologies for measuring ai
trustworthiness and AI risks”. In climate
and clean tech, both “work towards a com
mon methodology for joint eu-usrecom
mendations on selected carbonintensive
products”. In tech investment, the pair are
thinking about holding a “tabletop exer
cise” to learn how the other side reacts
when a Russian or Chinese firm comes
knocking to acquire a local company. In
other words, officials still are trying to find
a common language.
If concrete “deliverables”are few and
far between, it is because America and the
eu still live on different digital planets
when it comes to regulating big online
platforms like Facebook and Google. The
euis putting the finishing touches on a se
ries of sweeping laws, including the Digital
Markets Act, meant to increase competi
tion, and the Digital Services Act, to control
harmful content. No equivalent bills are
likely to make it through America’s Con
gress. Optimists note that ordinary Ameri
cans, if not their elected representatives,
seem open to the idea of such rules: they
trust tech companies even less than Euro
peans do (see chart).
That is partly a function of America’s
political gridlock, but partly also economic
nationalism, in that far more of the firms
to be regulated are American than Euro
pean. The euis guilty of similar protec
tionism: America’s negotiators want the
ttcto speed up the deployment of two new
ways of building mobile networks called
Openran (short for Open Radio Access
Network) and “virtualisation”. These
should make it easier for new providers of
telecommunications gear to emerge,
which would provide more competition
forHuawei,aChineseinformationtech
nologygiantwhichisaccusedofworking
closelywithspooksinBeijing.ButOpen
ranandvirtualisationalsoweakentwo
bigEuropeanfirms,EricssonandNokia,
whichareinthesamebusinessasHuawei.
AndtheycreateopportunitiesforAmeri
ca’sbigcloudproviders,inparticularAma
zonWebServicesandMicrosoft,togetin
volvedintelecoms.
More such squabbles are likely to
emergeoncethettcfocusesmorenarrow
lyonitsoriginalpurpose:challengingChi
na.“It’sonethingtonegotiateexportcon
trolsforRussia,wheretheeconomicim
pact is quite small, but things become
muchmoredifficulttodothisfora giant
like China,” says Martijn Rasser of the Cen
tre for a New American Security, a think
tank. China is central to most tech supply
chains. Many firms from both America and
the euhave big investments there.
Another problem is that neither side
can really be trusted to keep its promises. If
Donald Trump is reelected in 2024, or an
other Trumplike president enters the
White House, the ttcmay soon be forgot
ten. As for the eu, the European Court of
Justice may yet strike down the new ver
sion of “Privacy Shield”, too. Similar law
suits are possible in America as well. “It’s a
legal Rubik’s Cube,” says Peter Swire of the
Georgia Institute of Technology, who
helped develop the new agreement, which
has not yet been made public.
Counting your chips
Thettc’s admirers argue that the logical
response is for the council to be more am
bitious while it still can. They applaud its
bolder aims, such as creating common
rules for aiand increasing transatlantic
cooperation on cybersecurity. Another
way to strengthen the group would be to
invite other likeminded countries, such
as Japan and South Korea, or even large
companies and other organisations, to join
its deliberations. (Big tech firms and other
entities will attend the powwow in Saclay
on an informal basis.)
Some would even like the ttcto evolve
into a “tech alliance” of democracies, the
digital natocalled for when Mr Biden was
elected in late 2020. Recent developments
suggest a more probable outcome will be a
network of bilateral undertakings. In April
theeuagreed such a deal with India and
has embarked on a similar process with Ja
pan. Tech is also being discussed in the
Quad, the security dialogue between
America, Australia, India and Japan. “Just
as regulation tends to mirror the indus
tries that it’s regulating, the international
system is starting to mirror the industries
that they’re trying to address,” says Tyson
Barker of the GermanCouncil on Foreign
Relations, another thinktank. “Expect an
ecosystem of alliances.”n
Digital divide
Share of respondents who say they trust
technology companies, November 2021, %
Source: 2022 Edelman Trust Barometer
United States
Britain
Germany
France
Ireland
Spain
Italy
Netherlands
50 60 70 80