Moor, / Whose wily trains with smoothest course of speech / Have tied and
tanged in a dangerous war / The fierce and manly King of Portugal”
( 5 Pro. 2 – 5 ). Muly does, of course, deceive and coerce Sebastian, using false
promises to “set these Portugals a-work / To hew a way for me unto the crown”
( 4. 2. 70 – 71 ).^51 Yet it is Abdelmelec, not Muly, who is Sebastian’s political op-
ponent, as the title to the 1594 quarto—The Battell of Alcazar, fought in Bar-
barie, betweene Sebastian king of Portugall, and Abdelmelec king of Marocco.
With the death of Captaine Stukeley—stresses.^52 In scapegoating Muly, the Pre-
senter obscures the problem which the competing action underscores: Sebas-
tian’s own imperialist agenda, which has nation written all over it. Sebastian
markets his campaign in Morocco as a “holy Christian war,” designed “to
plant the Christian faith in Africa” ( 2. 4. 66 , 165 ), and his evangelical zeal is in-
extricably coupled to his overbearing intent: to make “Abdelmelec and great
Amurath” “tremble at” Portugal’s “strength” ( 2. 4. 48 – 49 ) and to “propagate the
fame of Portugal” ( 3. 1. 7 ). Even the Presenter admits that, while “honour was
object of [Sebastian’s] thoughts,” “ambition was his ground” ( 4 Pro. 13 )—and
ground, we might add, his ambition. Not only do Muly’s promises to “surren-
der up the kingdom of Moroccus” and to render the “realm of Fess” “con-
tributary” to Portugal lure the ambitious king into war ( 2. 4. 14 – 17 ); when the
legate from Spain assures Sebastian that the Spanish king will support his
campaign by sending “aid of arms,” offering his daughter in marriage as well
as title to “the Islands of Moloccus” ( 3. 1. 40 , 26 ), Sebastian immediately takes
the bait.
Clearly here, Sebastian’s mission to increase Portugal’s fame and territory
represents a political liability, blinding him to the competing aspirations of his
own ostensible allies. While he is sure that the king of Spain, like the would-
be king of Morocco, will give up terrain in order to “honour and enlarge” Por-
tugal’s “name,” as the Spanish legate suggests ( 3. 1. 21 ), others, better in tune
with the volatile ways of the world, are more skeptical and foresighted. Stuke-
ley, who has joined with Portugal by this point, surmises that Philip is “dis-
guising with a double face” and “flatter[ing] [Sebastian’s] youth and
forwardness” while arming for a conquest of Flanders ( 3. 1. 50 – 51 ). More im-
portantly, Abdelmelec rightly anticipates that, even if Spain’s promises are
real, its loyalties are negotiable: he sends a letter to the Spanish king to “crave
that in a quarrel so unjust, / He that entitlèd is the Catholic king, / Would not
assist a careless Christian prince” ( 3. 2. 14 – 16 ) and sways Philip to his side by
offering up “seven holds” [i.e., holdings] ( 3. 2. 18 ). As well, although Abdel-
melec is happy to let the Portuguese self-destruct, leaving him “guiltless” of
Enter Barbary 35