and represented in the political arena, which are central to China’s economic
longevity and political stability.
Resolving the ideological problems makes it easier to allow new members to join
the ‘people’. The second sentence of the tenth paragraph of the Preamble reads:
In the long years of revolution and construction, there has been formed
under the leadership of the Communist Party of China a broad
patriotic united front that is composed of the democratic parties and
people’s organizations and embraces all socialist working people, all
patriots who support socialism, and all patriots who stand for the
reunification of the motherland. This united front will continue to
be consolidated and developed.
After ‘a broad patriotic united front that is composed of the democratic parties and
people’s organizations and embraces all socialist working people’, the 2004
constitutional amendment adds ‘all builders of socialism’. Almost all Chinese
citizens – workers, peasants or those in private sectors – are making a contribution
to the economy, which entitles them ‘builders of socialism’. The emerging bour-
geoisie may well feel relieved since the Damoclean sword has now been removed
from the Constitution.
Constitutional review
The relationship between the judiciary and the Constitution has been a hot topic
since the year 2000. Because the judiciary has explicitly ruled out the possibility of
exercising jurisdiction over constitutional cases, China has been exploring alterna-
tives to establish an effective Chinese-style constitutional review system. In this
section two cases are contrasted to differentiate the two main approaches that have
been tested.^11 The first approach, which was tried and has failed, has been betting
on the Chinese judiciary to adopt the spirit of ‘common-law constitutionalism’,
where judges are the last defenders of the Constitution and of individual liberties
and rights. This approach continues to inspire many in China and is sometimes
echoed emotionally within the judiciary.
The Supreme People’s Court did consider this approach in theQi Yulingcase, a
judgment containing constitutional references. However, the failure of this
approach was anticipated because it is unrealistic to expect the judiciary to super-
vise the administration. In the Chinese political hierarchy, administrative heads are
usually superior to judges, who cannot risk irritating the administrations unless
specific support from a higher-level authority is granted. This situation also explains
(^11) For another introduction to these two cases, see Q. Zhang, ‘A constitution without
constitutionalism? The paths of constitutional development in China’ ( 2010 ) 8 Inter-
national Journal of Constitutional Law 950.