Second, unconventional constitutional adjudication is likely to be triggered or even
demanded by extraordinary constitutional politics. Last, but not least, quasi-
constitutional statutes are enacted as short-term solutions in response to political
gridlock that makes constitutional revisions difficult. Like most new democracies,
Taiwan’s constitutional developments in the 1990 s were considerably reflective of
these transitional features.^14
A consolidated democracy notwithstanding, the constitutional developments
of the first decade were still reflective of the aforementioned three features.
For instance, the constitutional revision in 2005 was seen as an important final
step in completing congressional reforms that began in the 1990 s. However, as a
consequence of political quid pro quo, this revision included a change to the
method of constitutional revision that makes subsequent revisions extremely diffi-
cult. The difficulty in constitutional revision naturally led to the passage of some
quasi-constitutional statutes, which were welcomed as short-term solutions to the
political stalemate in the divided government but left complex issues in the long
run. Judicial intervention in politically charged cases by the Constitutional Court
occurred even more often than in the 1990 s.
Constitutional revision that rendered subsequent changes difficult
From 1991 until now, the ROC constitution has endured seven rounds of consti-
tutional revision in Taiwan. In the previous six rounds of revision undertaken before
this new century, the issues of legitimacy and democratic representation were only
moderately addressed. The first session of delegates in the Legislative Yuan and
National Assembly, most of whom were elected in mainland China, were mandated
to step down; the names of the country – ROC – and the main text of the Constitution
remained intact; the affairs concerning mainland China were addressed by special
laws. Besides, the basic structure of government power shifted from a parliamentary
system to a semi-presidential one, in order to accommodate the dynamic interactions
between the ruling KMT and the rising opposition party, the DPP. While the call for
a brand new constitution never really dissipated, the course of constitutional change
followed the model of transitory arrangements. Constitutional revisions were made
round by round as democratic transition progressed stage by stage.^15
The last round of constitutional revision began in 2004 , after the DPP president
was reelected. The Legislative Yuan announced its proposal on August 26 , 2004.
In less than a year, on June 7 , 2005 , the National Assembly approved the proposal.
This seventh round of constitutional revision was the last passed by the National
Assembly, as one of the primary missions in this revision was to abolish the
National Assembly itself, making the Legislative Yuan the only legislative branch.
(^14) Ibid. (^15) Yeh, “Constitutional reform and democratization in Taiwan,” pp. 47 – 77.