In addition, the number of members of the Legislative Yuan was reduced by half
and the electoral rule changed to a proportional system. The Constitutional Court
was provided with the power to adjudicate presidential impeachment. Proposals for
territorial change or constitutional amendment would be required to pass a national
referendum with a very high threshold, demanding the approval of at least half of
the eligible voters.^16
Notably, this round of constitutional revision, except for the important accom-
plishments in parliamentary and electoral reforms, took a strong step in locking the
Constitution into its present state. The threshold for a constitutional revision to be
passed was made considerably high. The Constitution now mandates that proposals
for constitutional amendment must be passed by at least three-fourths of the
members present at a meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total
members of the Legislative Yuan, and that upon the expiration of a six-month
period from public announcement of the proposal, a public referendum must be
held. For any amendment proposal to succeed, it must have the approval of at least
one-half of the total eligible voters.
17
These stringent procedural requirements
demand no less than a national consensus for any constitutional amendment to
pass. In the absence of such consensus, the political status quo structured by the
current constitutional arrangements is entrenched.
Unconventional constitutional adjudication
The majority of highly controversial constitutional cases appeared after the
first regime change in the year 2000. The Constitutional Court was called upon,
many times, to resolve constitutional disputes involving presidential politics that
was reflective of political divisiveness. During the DPP administration, which
lasted from 2000 to 2008 , there were eleven cases associated with the role of the
president in the context of a divided government, where the DPP did not control
the majority of the Legislative Yuan. Five of the cases took place during President
Chen’s first term ( 2000 to 2004 ), the remaining six during his second term ( 2004 to
2008 ).^18 These disputes about government system and separation of powers were a
continuous focus of debate, particularly the scope of presidential powers after the
first regime change. There was a dispute regarding the contentious presidential
election of 2004 , J.Y. Interpretation No 585 ; disputes on separation of powers, J.Y.
Interpretation Nos 520 , 613 , 632 , and 645 ; and disputes between national and
local governments, J.Y. Interpretation Nos 550 and 553. Finally, there was even a
(^16) For the content of the seventh constitutional revision in 2005 , seehttp://english.president.
gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid= 1033 # 09.
(^17) Additional Articles, ROC Constitution (Taiwan), Art. 12.
(^18) For an overview and a more detailed analysis of these cases, see Yeh, “Presidential politics
and the judicial facilitation of dialogue,” 924.