dissatisfied with the Constitutional Court’s decision, accepted the ruling by revis-
ing the special Act for the commission to work within the narrowly defined
jurisdiction.
J.Y. Interpretation No 613 and J.Y. Interpretation No 645 are similar consti-
tutional decisions concerning power confrontations between government organiza-
tions. Against the backdrop of a divided government, the creation of independent
regulatory commissions became severely politicized. In creating the first independ-
ent commission, the National Communication Commission (NCC), the KMT
legislative majority tried to influence the appointment of commissioners. It wrote
into the law that independent commissioners were to be appointed directly by a
legislative appointment committee whose membership was to be allocated in
proportion to parliamentary seats held by political parties. Another, similarly
partisan, appointment formula for the Public Referendum Review Committee that
was tasked with reviewing referendum proposals was also enacted.
In the former case, the Constitutional Court rendered J.Y. Interpretation No 613.
While affirming that the legislature could exercise a significant degree of checks
and balances on the appointment process, the court held the partisan appointment
committee unconstitutional as it removed, entirely, executive influence over the
appointments, which would undermine the independence of the commission.
27
In the later case, J.Y. Interpretation No 645 , in defining the referendum review
committee as exercising purely executive functions, the court held that the partisan
appointment formula was unconstitutional, involving the transgression of executive
authority by the legislature.
28
The above analysis of judicial decisions rendered by the Constitutional Court
during the first decade of the twenty-first century shows that the court has been
increasingly mature in dealing with politically charged disputes. By resorting to
strategic avoidance or procedural solutions, the Constitutional Court has sought
to facilitate political dialogue between competing political actors in different
government branches. At the same time, however, when the time came for resolute
adjudication, the court was not hesitant to take a side in order to preserve the
constitutional balance of separation of powers.
Quasi-constitutional statutes
In Taiwan, aside from seven rounds of constitutional revision, statutes or govern-
ment actions have also taken up quite a few issues in the transitional stage.
The 2005 constitutional revision set for future constitution revisions a very stringent
(^27) J.Y. Interpretation No 613 ( 2006 ), available atwww.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/
p 03 01 .asp?expno= 613.
(^28) J.Y. Interpretation No 645 ( 2008 ), available atwww.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/
EN/p 03 01 .asp?expno= 645.