Many disputes surfaced concerning presidential powers and institutional conflicts,
and the president was usually at the center of the confrontation. Interestingly,
however, most such disputes were sent to the courts, especially the Constitutional
Court, where the quarrels were either settled or rephrased. Metaphorically, in a
ball game, while the president played the pitcher, who hurled the ball, most of the
time the court played the catcher.^75 While the courts may have concerns of self-
preservation, given the presidential power of judicial appointment, some strategic
approaches, in particular those approaches that tended to cultivate dialogue
between political branches, have proved effective in both defusing conflict and
protecting the legitimacy of the courts.^76 How the president and the court interact
will steer the main course of constitutional development in the next decade.
Finally, while recognizing that the judiciary and the president constitute the two
primary factors when forecasting the next decade, we would also like to highlight
the role of the people and of civil society. We observe, and propose, that civic
engagement may provide another force capable of shaping the future, and may be
the solution to those challenges generated by the development of transitional and
transnational constitutionalism. In fact, recent developments have shed some light
on the vitality of an ever-growing civil society in Taiwan. The suspension of martial
law in 1987 was the first step to release the strength of civil society; down the road of
democratic transition, especially when the Constitution was revised to popularly
elect the president, civil society was empowered to unleash its capacity. The
passage of the Referendum Act and the referenda that took place tested the strength
and ability of Taiwanese citizens to deliberate public issues. In addition, the
convergence of domestic constitutional norms and international human rights that
occurred in Taiwan would not have been possible without the engagement of local
NGOs.^77 Without a doubt, a great deal of effort is and will still be needed for civil
society to learn the ropes. Yet a mature and robust civil society deserves all of our
efforts, as it may be the ultimate solution to the challenges of accountability,
democratic deficit, and the rule of law destined to haunt postmodern democracies
in the face of transitional and transnational constitutionalism.
v. conclusion
The functions of constitutions have substantially changed in the last decade or two,
producing what are now understood as transitional and transnational constitution-
alism. This chapter has analyzed the constitutional development of Taiwan in the
(^75) Therefore how constitutional courts adjudicate on contentious presidential politics in new
democracies remains a significant issue in comparative constitutionalism. See Yeh, “Presi-
dential politics and the judicial facilitation of dialogue,” 911 ; Chang, “Strategic judicial
responses,” 885.
(^76) Yeh, “Presidential politics and the judicial facilitation of dialogue.”
(^77) Chang, “Global-minded citizens,” 230.