US$ 1. 9 billion, tax-free. Then there was the unrest in the south where the predom-
inantly Muslim population were agitating for greater autonomy and separation,
74
which Thaksin was seen to be handling ruthlessly.
In a desperate bid to stem the rising discontent, Thaksin called snap elections on
2 April 2006. The opposition boycotted the elections, seeing them as a manoeuvre
by Thaksin to win an easy victory. Instead, they campaigned for Thais to use their
‘no vote’ option at the polls. Quite a number of constituencies were uncontested. As
the 1997 constitution requires that unopposed candidates obtain at least 20 per cent
of the polled votes to win election, many Thai Rak Thai candidates lost their seats.
When all the votes were tallied, the Thai Rak Thai Party came in ‘second’ with
16 million votes whilst ‘first place’ went to the ‘no vote’ option. These results meant
that Thaksin was unable to form the government within the mandated thirty days
following the election. Thaksin then sought an audience with King Bhumibol and
pleaded to quit politics. The king appointed him caretaker prime minister. In the
meantime, the Constitutional Court was asked to consider the validity of the recent
elections and it declared them null and void on account of election malpractices.
It further announced that elections to the House of Representatives would be
tentatively scheduled for October 2006.
The 2006 coup d’e ́tat and the 2007 constitution
On 19 September 2006 , while Thaksin was on an overseas trip to the United States,
the military deposed him in a coup.
(^75) General Sondhi Boonyaratkalin, who led the
armed forces, promised to restore democratic government within one year and
promised the Thais a new constitution.^76 An interim constitution was drafted in
2006 and replaced by a permanent constitution in 2007. The drafters of the 2007
constitution were appointed by the military, and the draft constitution was
approved by a public referendum.^77 The narrow margin ( 58 per cent) by which
the Constitution was approved shocked the military who were surprised by the
strong support Thaksin continued to enjoy.
(^74) On the Muslim separatist movement in southern Thailand, see Duncan McCargo (ed.),
Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence (Singapore: NUS Press, 2006 ); Duncan
McCargo,Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand(Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2008 ); John N. Funston,Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of
Conflict(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008 ); and Moshe Yegar,Between
Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern
Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar(Lanham and Madison: Lexington Books, 2002 ).
(^75) See James Ockey, ‘Thailand in 2006 : retreat to military rule’ ( 2007 ) 47 ( 1 )Asian Survey 133.
(^76) See Tom Ginsburg, ‘Constitutional afterlife: the continuing impact of Thailand’s post-
political constitution’ ( 2009 ) 7 ( 1 )I·CON 83.
(^77) On the making of the 2007 constitution, see Chaowana Traimas and Jochen Hoerth,
‘Thailand: another new constitution as a way out of the vicious cycle?’, in Hill and Menzel,
Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia,p. 301 ,at 314 – 17.