Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century

(Greg DeLong) #1

dissolves the Legislative Assembly, it places the sultan in a quandary. Whether to


accede to the request of the Menteri Besar for a dissolution of the state legislature


is a matter of discretion. The circumstances here would justify the sultan deciding


to dissolve the state legislature and allowing the final say to the people of Perak.


If the Menteri Besar had chosen neither to resign office nor to request a


dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, a most undesirable situation would have


been re-created and would have unnecessarily drawn the sultan into deciding


whether to dismiss the Menteri Besar. A responsible Menteri would not put the


sultan in such a dilemma, and in the Perak crisis the sultan was spared such a


dilemma. N.H. Chan, a retired Malaysian judge, observed:


After the Sultan has appointed a Menteri Besar under Article 16 ( 2 )(a),


then, has he the executive power to remove him? The answer is definitely


no, because the only executive power left for the Sultan in which he ‘may


act in his discretion’ – after a Menteri Besar has been appointed under


Article 16 ( 2 )(a) – in respect of the Menteri Besar can only be found in


Article 18 ( 2 )(a) and (b). Apart from Article 18 ( 2 )(a) and (b) there is no


other executive power bestowed on the Sultan concerning the position


and status of the Menteri Besar. The Sultan, therefore, has no executive


power under the Perak Constitution to remove a Menteri Besar.^27


Professor Kevin Tan, adjunct professor of the National University of Singapore,


criticised the approach taken by the judges in the Court of Appeal and the Federal


Court:


I could not help but note the willingness with which the Court of Appeal


judges were prepared to overturn a trial judge’s finding of fact. The


recounting of facts went on for pages on end, and lamentably, the Federal


Court did the same thing. Almost half the Federal Court’s judgment was


concerned with how the facts should be read...The Federal Court


castigated the High Court judge for being perverse in refusing to believe


the evidence of the State Legal Advisor and the documentary evidence


before him even though they were not present at the trial.


Reading and re-reading the High Court judgment and those of Raus


Sharif and Zainun Ali JJCA in particular, it is not at all obvious that


Abdul Aziz J had erred, or if he did, erred to such an extent as to be


regarded as ‘perverse’...Unless Abdul Aziz J is openly accused of


bias (which was never argued), then what he did was perfectly legitim-


ate and professional. At least he did not make the mistake of taking


judicial notice of a supposition of his own making, which the Court of


Appeal did. Appellate courts should really confine themselves to


(^27) N.H. Chan, ‘The Federal Court in Nizar v Zambry: a critique’, LoyarBurok website,
19 February 2010 ,http://loyarburok.com/selected-judgments/the-federal-court-in-nizar-v-
zambry-a-critique.


254 Lee

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