that she produce a certificate or a declaration or an order from the
Syariah Court that she has apostatised?
(b) Whether the NRD has correctly construed its power under the
national Registration Regulations 1990 , in particular regs 4 and 14 ,
to impose the requirement as stated above when it is not expressly
provided for in the 1990 Regulations?
(c) WhetherSoon Singhwas rightly decided when it adopted the
implied jurisdiction theory...which declared that unless an express
jurisdiction is conferred on the Syariah Court, the civil courts will
retain their jurisdiction?^59The Federal Court, by a 2 – 1 decision (Ahmad Fairuz CJ, Alauddin Mohd Sherif FCJ
and Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah and Sarawak) dissenting), dismissed her appeal
from the decision of the Court of Appeal. The majority (writing their judgment in
the Malay language, which is rather surprising for a superior court) answered all
three questions in the affirmative while Richard Malanjum (writing in English),
dissenting, answered them in the negative.^60 The substantive effect of the majority
decision is that a Muslim cannot exit the Islamic faith without obtaining the
approval of the Syariah Court. In a critical analysis of the decision, Dato’ Cyrus
Das remarked, ‘what is pervasive in most of the state syariah laws is: if a Muslim wants
to exit the religion, he or she can be detained and put in a place called a Faith
Rehabilitation Centre’.^61 He highlighted the case of Revathi, a Muslim by birth and
a Hindu by choice, who ‘was placed in a camp and subjected to a lengthy period of
so-called rehabilitation’.^62 The stance of the majority represented an abdication of
the role of the highest court of the land as a guardian of the Constitution. The
decision derogated from the declared supremacy of the Constitution. It undermined
the general guarantee under Article 11 of Muslim Malaysians to invoke the right to
practise and profess the religion of their choice by interposing a third party whose
approval has to be obtained in order to change religion. It failed to accord with
the norms of administrative law by allowing an unwritten policy to prevail over a
constitutional guarantee.
63
Pointing to Lina Joyand other case authorities,
64
Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil of the MARA University of Technology said,
(^59) [ 2007 ] 4 MLJ 585 at 623.
(^60) A.L.R. Joseph, ‘Unfettered religious freedom hangs by the thread of minority dissent in
Malaysia: a review of the dissenting judgment of the Federal Court in theLina Joy Case’
( 2009 ) 14 ( 2 )Review of Constitutional Studies 205.
(^61) Das, ‘Constitutional supremacy and the Lina Joy decision, p. 46. (^62) Ibid.
(^63) Ibid., p. 49. In AbdulKahar bin Ahmadv.Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (Kerajaan Malaysia,
intervener) and Another[ 2008 ] 3 MLJ 617 ,at 623 , the Federal Court held that Article 121
( 1 A) ‘does not confer jurisdiction on the Syariah Courts to interpret the Constitution to the
exclusion of the [Federal Court]’.
(^64) Daud Mamat and Othersv.The Government of Kelantan and Another[ 2001 ] 2 CLJ 161 ; and
Kamariah Ali and Othersv.The Government of Kelantan and Another[ 2002 ] 3 MLJ 657.