which commands a parliamentary majority of more than two-thirds, could have
invoked a parliamentary override mechanism against a recalcitrant president.
12
The first decade also saw two general elections in 2006 and 2011 , with the
PAP winning strong majorities of eighty-two out of eighty-four seats (with 66. 6 per
cent of the national vote) and eighty-one out of eighty-seven elective seats
(with 60. 1 per cent of the national vote) respectively. The ‘watershed’ 2011 general
elections ushered in a ‘new normal’ of a repoliticised political landscape. In
addition to nearly all seats being contested,^13 for the first time since group
representation constituencies (GRCs) were introduced in 1988 , the opposition
Workers’ Party won the Aljunied GRC ward ( 54. 7 per cent), unseating two
Cabinet ministers and ushering five opposition MPs into parliament. The GRC
scheme requires parties to field a team comprising at least one member from a
stipulated minority group, to ensure multiracial parliamentary representation.
Voters in GRC wards cast one vote for a team which they must accept on a
‘package-deal’ basis. GRCs have ranged in size from the original three to a
supersized six, and have historically been used by the PAP to induct fresh blood
into parliament,
14
by riding the coat-tails of an established ministerial anchor. The
GRCs have been criticised as a means of perpetuating the PAP stronghold and
stultifying the growth of a parliamentary opposition, even though, as a vehicle for
electoral contests, the GRC is ‘neutral.’
15
The psychological effect of seeing incumbent Cabinet ministers defeated at the
polls perhaps explains the post-election admonition of the third prime minister,
Lee Hsien Loong, to newly elected MPs: ‘There is no tenure or job security in
politics.’^16 An unfamiliar humility was evident in PM Lee’s apologising to the
electorate during the hustings^17 for mistakes made.^18 PM Lee made good on
promises at his 2011 swearing-in ceremony to review disquieting millionaire salaries
government companies (Cmd 5 of 1999 ). It contained ground rules governing institutional
relations, formulated after an embarrassing 1999 public dispute between President Ong Teng
Cheong and the government.(^12) E.g. Art. 148 A, D.
(^13) Only Lee Kuan Yew’s Tanjong Pagar GRC ward was uncontested, as a potential challen-
ger was unable to raise the deposit funds: ‘GE: SDA Pulls out of Tanjong Pagar Contest’,
Channelnewsasia.com at 25 April 2011.
(^14) ‘GRCs kill two birds with one stone: they ensure a multi-racial Parliament and help in the
recruitment of candidates with Ministerial potential’ as few successful Singaporeans would
enter politics ‘without some assurance of a good chance of winning at least their first
elections’. Senior Minister C.T. Goh, Remarks, South East CDC Appointment Ceremony,
26 June 2006 , Arts House.
(^15) PM Goh asserted that the GRC scheme was ‘objectively, theoretically, if you like,
scientifically neutral. The key is who can produce the better team’. ‘GRC Changes: Are
They Intended to Fix the Opposition?’,Straits Times, 29 October 1996 , 20.
(^16) ‘PM Lee’s Letter to MPs’, Asiaone.com, 28 May 2011 , para. 34.
(^17) ‘PM Says Sorry over Mistakes, Pledges to Do Better’,Straits Times, 3 May 2011.
(^18) Mistakes cited including letting detained terrorist Mas Selamat escape and the Orchard
Road floodings: ‘PM: Why I Said Sorry’, Asiaone.com, 5 May 2011.