manipulation of the rules to frustrate Congress’s impeachment power, and her use
of executive privilege to suppress evidence.
Impeachment – the only mechanism to render a president accountable during
his or her term – never worked against President Arroyo. The dilution of the
impeachment power actually began rather innocuously.
In June 2003 , deposed president Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr for swearing in Arroyo as
president. That complaint did not prosper. A few months later, in October 2003 ,
another impeachment complaint was filed against Davide for his questionable use
of a special judiciary fund. His supporters saw this as a rearguard action by the
Estrada camp, and asked the Supreme Court to block it, citing a constitutional bar
on a second impeachment within a one-year period.^24 The question was whether
the first impeachment complaint by Estrada, even if it did not prosper, was deemed
“initiated” such as to trigger the one-year bar. The court said yes, construed that
rule in favor of the accused, and struck down the second impeachment complaint.
The unworthy beneficiary of all this would be President Arroyo. In 2005 , in the
aftermath of the Garci Tapes crisis, several impeachment complaints would be
filed against Arroyo, all of which were defeated by a combination of legal techni-
cality (wherein an Arroyo supporter would be first to file a weak impeachment
complaint, thus pre-empting the bona fide challengers) and parliamentary
numbers, bolstered by the well-timed releases of pork barrel.
25
The second failing of Congressional oversight was the impairment of the power
of legislative inquiry.
(^26) In response to public outrage, the Senate investigated
government corruption and summoned various officials of the military. However,
President Arroyo invoked executive privilege and issued a gag order on the
executive branch, including the military. The order required department heads,
officers who “in the judgment” of the head of the department are covered by the
executive privilege, and “such other officers as may be determined by the Presi-
dent” to secure the consent of the president before testifying to Congress.^27
The Supreme Court narrowed the scope of executive privilege by requiring the
president to extend the privilege expressly in each case, and only to specified
personnel. It agreed that certain information must remain confidential for the
public interest, and the “necessity [for disclosure] must be of such high degree as
to outweigh the public interest.”
28
(^24) Franciscov.House of Representatives, G.R. No 160261 (November 10 , 2003 ). Note: the
author wasamicuscounsel in this case.
(^25) Juan Miguel de Jesus, “Distorting the rule of law: the Committee on Justice and the 2005
impeachment proceedings,” ( 2005 ) 80 Philippine Law Journal 236.
(^26) Constitution Art.vi,§ 22.
(^27) Exec. Order No 464 §§ 1 , 2 (b) and 3 (Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the
Rights of Public Officials in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Consti-
tution) (September 26 , 2005 ).
(^28) Senatev.Ermita, G.R. No 169777 (April 20 , 2006 ).