Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century

(Greg DeLong) #1

However, the court diluted that ruling in a subsequent case involving military


generals, by invoking military disciplinary rather than executive privilege.


Two marine officers were poised to testify against President Arroyo, but the court


upheld the gag order, citing, however, the president’s commander-in-chief powers


“to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces,” which are “not


hampered by the same limitations” as under executive privilege.^29


Finally, executive privilege was again invoked in 2007 , after President Arroyo’s


own cabinet secretary for economic planning testified that he informed her of a


bribe attempt relating to a telecommunications project financed by the People’s


Republic of China. Summoned by the Senate, he invoked executive privilege


when asked about issues that would directly implicate the president, namely


whether the president showed undue interest in the project and actually gave her


approval even after she had been apprised of the bribe attempt.^30


The president successfully invoked executive privilege lest the disclosure “impair


our diplomatic as well as economic relations with [China, since the cabinet official


cannot answer] without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to


protect,” thus impinging upon the “authority of the President to enter into execu-


tive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature [which] has tradition-


ally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.”
31


Power grab via constitutional revision


The post-Marcos constitution deliberately installed safeguards against a repeat


of the unending extensions of Marcos’s presidential terms from 1965 to 1986.


The solution was simple: a single six-year term without re-election. But the post-


Marcos drafters, to emulate the revolutionary nature of the anti-Marcos uprising,


also created a new mode to revise the Constitution, namely “people’s initiative,”


a direct initiative by citizens rather than by government. Just as in many Latin


American countries, the battle against ambitious presidents-for-life was fought over


the lifting of term limits through constitutional revision.


In 1992 , Cory Aquino turned over the presidency to Fidel Ramos, the former


general. In 1998 , as his six-year term was about to end, there was suddenly a people’s


initiative to revise the Constitution and lift term limits. The initiative was made by


a shadowy group organized specifically to collect the requisite signatures to start the


process. The Supreme Court went out of its way to strike down the initiative, laid


out every possible technicality, and blocked it altogether.
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(^29) Gudaniv.Senga, G.R. No 170165 (August 15 , 2006 ).
(^30) Neriv.SenateG.R. No 180643 (March 25 , 2008 ). (^31) Ibid.
(^32) Defensor-Santiagov.Commission on Elections, G.R. No 127325 (March 19 , 1997 ); and
People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Actionv.Commission on Elections, G.R.
No 129754 (September 23 , 1997 ).


Philippine constitutional law 303

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