Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century

(Greg DeLong) #1

the MPR is not the highest state organ any more, but one of the high state organs,


along with other state organs.


Article 20 A, a new provision of the 1945 constitution, states that the DPR has the


following functions and rights: making laws, examining state budgets, checking


administration activities and interpellating (hak interpelasi) and investigating gov-


ernment affairs (hak angket). In addition, DPR members have the rights to submit


questions, deliver proposals, express opinions and present views with immunity


(hak imunitas).


Three new institutions: the House of Regional Representatives, the Judicial
Commission and the Constitutional Court

Following the 1999 – 2002 amendements to the 1945 constitution, there are three


new institutions created to support Indonesian democracy. First, the establishment


of the House of Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah – DPD) is


regulated in Article 22 C and 22 D. With this provision, regional representatives are


directly elected in each province, forming an independent legislative assembly.


The DPD has the authority to discuss, supervise and submit laws on regional


autonomy or central–local relations. In addition, the DPD possesses the right to


submit considerations to the DPR on the state budget and to draft laws relating to


tax, education and religion. The members of the DPD may not exceed one-third of


the numbers of the DPR.


The DPD was created with one main expectation: to provide a new kind of


regional representation to enter into national-level decision-making in order to


allow the voice of the regions to be heard in the making of laws and the oversight of


central executive government. However, the structural features built into the DPD


make it very difficult for the assembly to have its voice heard in lawmaking,


oversight and accountability of government and the provision of both popular


and regional representation. The major concern is that the DPD does not pass


legislation. Despite the fact that it has strong legitimacy that comes from being a


fully elected chamber, it can only introduce or give advice on a certain range of


bills in the DPR.


Stephen Sherlock of the Australian National University correctly points out that


the DPD could be seen as only an advisory body since the DPR is under no


obligation to pass or even to consider seriously laws drafted by the DPD, or to


accept its advice.
9
The DPD is not a true ‘upper house’ because its limited powers


mean that it merely complements, rather than supplements, the DPR. As a matter


(^9) Stephen Sherlock, ‘Indonesia’s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Represen-
tation and the Regions: A Report on the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD)’, CDI Policy
Papers on Political Governance 2006 / 1 , available atwww.cdi.anu.edu.au/_research/ 2005 -
06 /DP/ 2006 05 PPS 1 _SS.pdf.


326 Hosen

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