of fact, it is in no way comparable to the US Senate or to upper houses in the
bicameral parliaments that exist in both the Westminster tradition and in many
presidential systems of government.^10 A further potential problem regarding the
DPD may be found in the absence in the amended constitution of any detailed
stipulation of the DPD’s rights and, in particular, the rights of its members. This is
seen, for example, in the absence of any provisions granting immunity for DPD
members matching that granted to members of the DPR.
Second, Clause 3 of Article 24 A, and Article 24 B, regulate the newly established
independent Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial). It has the role of proposing
candidates to the DPR, the DPR then selects its preferred candidates from the
commission’s list and they are confirmed by the president. The Judicial Commis-
sion is also empowered to guard and enforce judicial ethics (Article 24 B( 1 )).^11
The Judicial Commission’s members are appointed by the president with the
agreement of the DPR. The precise authority of the Judicial Commission, outlined
by Law No 22 on the Judicial Commission, was subject to disagreement between
the Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court.
12
In May 2006 , the Judicial
Commission questioned a judgment of the Supreme Court in a case involving the
arrest of a businessman and also recommended that the judges who had found
the directors of Bank Mandiri not guilty of corruption should be suspended.
It made five recommendations to the Supreme Court that sanctions be imposed
on errant judges but none were implemented and at least six judges refused to
appear before the Judicial Commission. By mid- 2006 , the Supreme Court had
failed to respond to eighteen recommendations.^13 Members of other branches of
the legal system, such as Supreme Court judges, were reported to have taken the
view that the Judicial Commission was exceeding its powers in attempting to
summon judges and this was directly against judicial independence.
The commission suffered a major blow to its authority when the Constitutional
Court in August 2006 granted a request filed by thirty-one judges of the Supreme
Court to drop activities that gave the commission the power to investigate alleged
violations by Supreme Court and Constitutional Court justices. Following the
Constitutional Court decision, it was agreed that the powers of the Judicial
Commission needed to be clarified.^14 Thus Law No 18 of 2011 gives more power
(^10) Susi Dwi Harijanti and Tim Lindsey, ‘Indonesia: general elections test the amended
constitution and the new Constitutional Court’ ( 2006 ) 4 ( 1 )International Journal of
Constitutional Law 138.
(^11) See Denny Indrayana,Indonesian Constitutional Reform 1999 – 2002 : An Evaluation of
Constitution-Making in Transition(Jakarta: Kompas Book Publishing, 2008 ).
(^12) Nicola Colbran, ‘Courage under fire: the first five years of the Indonesian Judicial
Commission’ ( 2009 ) 11 ( 2 )Australian Journal of Asian Law 273.
(^13) Harold Crouch,Political Reform in Indonesia after Soeharto(Singapore: ISEAS, 2010 ),
p. 222.
(^14) See Simon Butt, ‘Banishing judicial accountability? The Constitutional Court’s decision
in the dispute between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission’, in Andrew